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Hearing the States
Anthony Johnstone*
Abstract
The 2016 Presidentialand Senate elections raise the possibility that a
conservative, life-tenuredSupreme Court willpreside for years over apolitically dynamic majority. This threatens to weaken the public's alreadyfragile confidence in the Court. By lowering the politicalstakes of both national
elections and its own decisions, federalism may enable the Court to defuse
some of the most explosive controversiesit hears. Federalism offers a second-best solution, even ifneither conservativesnor liberalscan impose a
nationalpoliticalagenda. However, principledfederalism arguments are
tricky. They are structural, more prudentialthan legal or empirical. Regardless ofideology, a bias towardfederalpower is hard-wiredinto the
modernjudicial appointmentprocess. Once on the bench, Justices see an
increasingly elite bar of Washington D.C. specialistssteeped in federal
practice, even when hearing cases concerning state sovereignty. These are
problemsfor the Court, despite its likely sympathy for federalism arguments
in years to come. This article suggests one solution: help the Court hear the
states. Relatively minor reforms to the Court's approachin cases impacting
state sovereignty could harness the politics of state attorneys general to help
the Court hear all states more clearly, facilitate a more principledfederalism, and depoliticize the Court itself States cannot help protect the Court
from politicization, however, if their attorneys generalfall victim to the same
nationalpolarizingforces that threaten the Court. Any reforms to help the
Court hear the states better, therefore, must also help the states keep their
voices strong and independent.

* Professor, Alexender Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana. The author
served as the State Solicitor for Montana (2008-2011). Thanks to Margaret Lemos, William Marshall,
Carolyn Shapiro, Dan Schweitzer, James Tierney, Ernest Young, and participants at the Pepperdine
Law Review Symposium on The Supreme Court, Politics, & Reform for helpful discussions. Thanks
to Constance Van Kley, Jesse Flickinger, and Rebecca Stursberg for research and editorial assistance,
and to my family for their support.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2016 Presidential and Senate elections suggest the possibility that a
conservative, life-tenured United States Supreme Court will preside for years,
even decades, over a politically diverse and increasingly polarized nation.
Such an outcome threatens to weaken the public's already fragile confidence
in the Court. On one hand, the Court must navigate a principled course
through a politically charged docket. Increasing political opposition to its rulings could draw the Court's institutional standing down to unprecedented
lows.' Yet compromising legal principles according to prevailing sentiment
could further cultivate the view that the Court plays politics. On the other
hand, the legal principles the Court holds are determined in large part by politics through the appointment process. 2 Even when those principles reflect the
politics of the time at appointment, however, the Justices' increasingly long
tenures can open divides between their principles and the principles reflecting

1. See infra Section II.A.

2. See infra Section II.B.
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the politics of later decades. Those divides start wide when other non-majoritarian political processes align in the appointment of Justices who will serve
for decades after the politically fortuitous moment.
Federalism offers the Court a course through these perils. 3 Federalism
lowers the political stakes of both national elections and judicial decisions. It
may enable the Court to defuse some of the most explosive controversies
likely to appear before it. Federalism also has the virtue of consistency with
the conservative ideology that the Court's likely future majorities will share.
Principled federalism offers a second-best solution for conservatives who can
settle for limiting federal power in Washington, and liberals who can settle for
realizing progressive policies close to home, even if neither can impose a national political agenda.
The problem with the course of federalism, however, is that even principled proponents find it hard to follow. Federalism arguments are structural
arguments, relying on prudential claims more than either constitutional text or
empirical facts. Substantive policy preferences may cloud a Justice's view of
constitutional structure. Regardless of ideology, a bias toward federal power
is hard-wired into the modem judicial appointment process. The farm team
for future Justices is the federal government. Presidents looking to make safe
and effective lifetime appointments rely on loyalty to the federal executive
branch, not to state legislatures. Senators in the confirmation process generally do not want to hear from a nominee that their policy powers are circumscribed. Once on the bench, Justices see an increasingly elite bar of Washington D.C. specialists steeped in federal practice, even when hearing cases
concerning state sovereignty.
These are problems for the Court, despite its likely sympathy for federalism arguments in years to come. This article suggests one solution: help the
Court hear the states. There is a corps of competent advocates with impeccable political pedigrees-left, right, and center-ready and willing to help
the Court counter the inside-the-beltway wisdom and see its way to a federal5
ism the states want and the Court needs: state attorneys general.
Attorneys general already enjoy influence with the Court second only to
the United States Solicitor General. The Court's federal situation, however,
may require even stronger state voices for their diverse perspectives to be

3. See infra Section III.A.
4. See infra Section III.B.

5. See infra Section IV.A.
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heard.6 Although several of the Court's rules accommodate the states, other
practices undermine the role of state attorneys general. Worse, the political
polarization around the Court's agenda threatens to extend into the states and
compromise their role as credible advocates of federalism. Relatively minor
reforms to the Court's approach in cases impacting state sovereignty could
harness the politics of state attorneys general to help the Court hear all states
more clearly, facilitate a more principled federalism, and help to depoliticize
the Court itself.7
This article presents the problem and a solution in three parts. Part II
describes the political tensions likely to arise as a conservative Supreme Court
presides over a potentially skeptical nation. Part III draws on a conventional
account of federalism as a safeguard for judges from politics and proposes
federalism as a way for the Court to remain both principled and sufficiently
popular to be effective. Part IV establishes the state attorneys general as credible advocates for principled federalism, so long as they can discern state interests independently of national politics. It suggests several modest reforms
to the Court's procedure and deliberations to reinforce the states' credibility.
A brief conclusion offers two paths forward for state attorneys general, only
one of which will safeguard the Court and federalism in the decades ahead.
II.

THE PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL COURT

Politics matter for the Supreme Court. Although the Court enjoys a relatively large measure of autonomy, it faces several constraints from the conventional "political branches," elites, and public opinion more broadly.8 The
confirmation battle to fill the seat vacated by Justice Scalia, with the Republican Senate's pre-election disregard of President Obama's nominee and postelection embrace of President Trump's nominee, is only the most recent example.9 From year to year, public opinion may constrain the Court's approach

6. See infra Section IV.B.
7. See infra Section IV.C.
8. See generally Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court CaresAbout Elites,
Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Courta Majoritarian'Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REv. 103 (2010).
9. See Tessa Berenson, How Neil Gorsuch 's Confirmation Fight ChangedPolitics, TiME (Apr.

7, 2017), http://time.com/4730746/neil-gorsuch-confirmed-supreme-court-year/;

see generally The

Times Editorial Board, It's Not Neil Gorsuch 'sfault, but We Can't Support HisAscension to a Stolen

Supreme Court Seat, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-edneil-gorsuch-20170325-story.html.
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to highly controversial issues such as abortion or major social welfare reform
like the Affordable Care Act, or facilitate the Court's rapid movement on issues such as same-sex marriage.10 In a decade, presidential regimes, such as
President Reagan's commitment to new federalism, change the Court's course
through appointments. 1 Over the course of decades, both formal amendments, such as the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, and informal constitutional moments, such as the New Deal, bring watershed changes to constitutional doctrine. 12 Opinions that diverge sharply from public opinion and
the political branches on major issues are rare, at least over the long term.1 3
The Supreme Court also matters for politics. Its direct role in shaping the
national law of politics for both the federal and state governments is greater
than that of either of the Congress or the presidency. 4 From Reynolds v.
Sims 15 to Bush v. Gore1 6 to Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission,1
the Supreme Court structures the very nature of representation in American
democracy." The Court's indirect effects on politics through public opinion
and complex mechanisms of legitimation, backlash, and polarization, are significant but limited by public ignorance of most of the Court's cases.1 9 From

10. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); see also Obergefell

v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Cass R. Sunstein, Don't Expect the Supreme Court to Change Much,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-09/don-t-expectthe-supreme-court-to-change-much.
11. See Joan Biskupic, Reagan's Influence Lives on in U.S. Courts, USA TODAY, https://usato-

day3O.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2008-05-11-appellate-judgesN.htm (last visited Mar.
6, 2018); John Kincaid, The New Federalism Context of the New JudicialFederalism, 26 RUTGERS

L.J. 913, 924-25 (1995).
12. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).

13. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 382 ("What history shows is assuredly not that Supreme
Court decisions always are in line with popular opinion, but rather that they come into line with one
another over time."); see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court

as a NationalPolicymaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (noting that "the policy views dominant on
the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States").
14. See Anthony Johnstone, The FederalistSafeguards of Politics, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL.

416, 433-42 (2016).
15. 377 U.S. 533, 568-69 (1964).
16. 531 U.S. 98, 109-10 (2000).
17. 558 U.S. 310, 324, 337, 365 (2010).
18. See Johnstone, supra note 14, at 433.
19. See Nathaniel Persily, Introduction,in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY

3, 3-15 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
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its decisions in Brown v. BoardofEducation20 to Roe v. Wade 21 to Districtof
Columbia v. Heller,22 the Court at least provides focal points for mobilization
(or demobilization) of political movements, and at times may prove a decisive
influence on national elections. 23
A.

Too Much Politics

The influence of politics on the Court and the Court on politics can benefit
both the Court and politics, for example, by resolving the counter-majoritarian
difficulty of judicial review and defending baseline norms of democratic participation. 2 4 At a moment of historic political polarization, however, the
Court's politicization threatens the integrity of both the Court and political
institutions. President Trump, elected with a minority of the popular vote and
a relatively narrow margin in the electoral college, 25 likely will have at least
one additional appointment in his first term, and at least two appointments if
he serves two terms. 26 Given the age and ideology of the current Justices, 27
20. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
21. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
22. 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
23.

See David G. Savage, Trump's Victory Ensures a Conservative Majority on the Supreme

Court, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-trump-supremecourt-20161109-story.html ("The future of the Supreme Court's ideological balance proved to be a
critical factor for many Republican voters. In exit polls, about 1 in 5 voters said the Supreme Court
appointments were 'the most important factor' in their decision, and those voters favored Trump by a
57% to 40% margin, according to ABC News.").
24. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 103

(1980) (arguing judicial independence "does not give [federal courts] some special pipeline to the
genuine values of the American people: in fact it goes far to ensure that they won't have one. It does,
however, put them in a position objectively to assess claims . . . that . .. our elective representatives

in fact are not representing the interests of those whom the system presupposes they are.").
25.

See Jugal K. Patel & Wilson Andrews, Trump's Electoral College Victory Ranks 46th in 58

Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/18/us/elections
/donald-trump-electoral-college-popular-vote.html/.
26.

See Oliver Roeder, Clinton and Trump Are Both Promising an Extreme Supreme Court,

FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 1, 2016, 9:59 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-and-trumpare-both-promising-an-extreme-supreme-court/ ("Thanks to the relentless, unidirectional drumbeat of
time, Trump would have a good chance to replace at least one of [Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, or
Breyer], pushing the court in a conservative direction."); see also Jason Le Miere, Trump Thinks He
Could Appoint Four Supreme Justices-In Just One Term, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 16, 2017, 4:10 PM),

http://www.newsweek.com/trump-supreme-court-Justice-appoint-686076 (stating that, due to health
and age-related concerns, several more vacancies could open up on the Supreme Court during Trump's
presidential term).
27.
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the near-term prospects for Senate control, 28 and the tendency for Justices to
time their departures strategically (when possible), 29 it is possible that conservative Republican appointees could hold a 6-3 supermajority on the Court
for decades.
With such high stakes, it is not surprising that the Court can tend to distort
ordinary politics in the other branches. One example is the elimination of the
filibuster in Supreme Court nominations. The execution of the "nuclear option" in the confirmation process may reshape the norms that protect the filibuster's minority-protecting function in legislation generally. Similarly, extension of political conflict over the Supreme Court confirmation process
deeper into Senate campaigns provides an additional lever for polarization and
distracts from basic questions of policy at the federal and state levels.30 These
pressures on the political branches are likely to increase with the stakes of
confirmation battles for seats now occupied by the oldest members of the
Court: Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Meanwhile, partisan polarization has changed the Court, decisively, for
the long term. 3 1 In an unprecedented development, the ideology of Supreme
Court Justices' votes in divided major cases reliably aligns with the party of
the appointing President. 32 The polarization on the bench is a lagging consequence of increasing polarization in the political branches, and for that reason

om/Hx/SupremeCourt.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2017).
28. See Jasmine C. Lee and Alicia Parlapiano, Democrats Need to Win 28 Seats to Control the
Senate. RepublicansNeed Only 8, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2018), available at https://nyti.ms/2BhYrHQ

("This election year, the political climate favors Democrats ... But in the Senate . . .they must keep
all of their seats and win two of the Republican seats in play. It is numerically possible, but there is
little room for error.").
29.

See Ross M. Stolzenberg & James Lindgren, Retirement and Death in Office of U.S. Supreme

CourtJustices, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 269, 291 (2010) (finding support for the conventional wisdom that
Supreme Court Justices time their departures and are about 2.6 times more likely to resign under a
president of the same party as the president that nominated the Justice).
30.

See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy Nuclear Option' to ClearPathfor Gor-

such, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6,2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supre
me-court-senate.html; see also Z. Byron Wolf, Will Kennedy retire and be Republicans'Senate sav-

ior?, CNN (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/09/politics/anthony-kennedy-gop-hopingfor-a-supreme-court-vacancy/index.html.
31. See AdamLiptak, The PolarizedCourt, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2014/05/1 1/upshot/the-polarized-court.html.
32. See id. ("By contrast [to only two cases before 2010 that arguably broke along party lines], in
just the last three terms, there were five major decisions that were closely divided along partisan
lines.. . .").
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is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.3 3 Nearly two-thirds of Americans recognize the Court's polarization, reporting that "Supreme Court Justices are split on political grounds like Congress."3 4 The Supreme Court's job
approval rating recently matched a record low of 42%,35 with trust in the judicial branch sliding from around 80% before the Court's intervention in the
2000 Presidential election through Bush v. Gore3 6 to around 60%, nearing the
50% mark that is normal for a President (though still holding comfortably
above Congress, which is in the 30% range). 37
Consistent with trends in the political branches, public opinion of the
Court may be converging on citizens' views of the substance of their decisions, rather than the Court's distinct institutional role. 3 8 It is unlikely that
public opinion would turn decisively against a single unpopular decision. 39
Professor Tom Clark explains, "courts generally benefit from high levels of
diffuse support (especially relative to the other branches of government) that

33. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party PolarizationTurned the Supreme Court into a PartisanCourt, 2016 SUP. CT. REv. 301 (2016).

34. See Robert Green & Adam Rosenblatt, Supreme CourtSurvey, C-SPAN / PSB (2017), https://s
tatic.c-span.org/assets/documents/scotusSurvey/CSPAN%20PSB%20 Supreme%20Court%20 Survey
%20COMPREHENSIVE%20AGENDA%20sent%2003%2013%2017.pdf.
35.

See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Supreme CourtJob Approval Rating Ties Record Low, GALLUP

(July 29, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/194057/supreme-court-job-approval-rating-ties-recordlow.aspx?g source=SUPREMECOURT&g medium=topic&g campaign=tiles.
36. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
37.

See Lydia Saad, Americans' Confidence in Government Takes Positive Turn, GALLUP (Sept.

19, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/19563 5/americans-confidence-government-takes-positivetum.aspx?gsource=SUPREME COURT&g medium=topic&g campaign=tiles (confidence slipped
to 53% in 2015 and rose to 61% in September 2016). In the latest ratings from the first year of the
Trump Administration, trust in the judicial branch increased to 68% (due to a large increase in trust
by Republicans, offsetting a smaller decrease in trust by Democrats, in the year of Justice Gorsuch's
confirmation), while trust in the executive branch declined to 45%, and trust in the legislative branch
held at 35%. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in JudicialBranch Up, Executive Branch Down, GALLUP

(Sept. 20, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-executive-branch-down.as
px?version=print.
38. See David Fontana & Donald Braman, JudicialBacklash or Just Backlash? Evidence from a

NationalExperiment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 734 (2012) (emphasis added) ("The public may or
may not like it when the Court restrains majoritarian action in the name of the Constitution or when
Congress intervenes in constitutional issues, but this is contingent on whether it likes or dislikes the
valence of the result commanded rather than a sense that the wrong institution is commanding the
result.").
39. See id.; see also TOM S. CLARK, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 125 (Bruce Pea-

body ed., 2011).
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enable them to weather the fallout from even exceedingly unpopular individual decisions." 0 As the Court's diverges further from the public in case after
case, however, that reservoir of diffuse support may draw down, leaving the
Court high and dry, politically stranded, and weak in public confidence.
This spells trouble for an institution whose legitimacy famously depends on
2
"neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment."4
B.

Not Enough Politics

A lack of political influence on the Court poses risks too. More precisely,
the lagging effects of a politicized appointment process risks a deep disconnect between a Court comprising today's Presidential appointments and the
politics of the nation two decades from now. The disconnect begins with the
current distance between a moderate popular majority4 3 and conservative judicial appointments made by an historically unpopular President with the advice and consent of a decreasingly majoritarian Senate. 4 Over a decades-long

40. See CLARK, supra note 39, at 126.

41. See Fontana & Braman, supra note 38, at 781-82 (discussing the consequences judicial opinions may have on public opinion of the court); see also Eric Segall, Supremely Elite: The Lack of
Diversity on OurNation's Highest Court, ABA HUM. RIGHTS MAG. (2015), https://www.americanbar

.org/publications/human rightsmagazinehome/2015--vol--41-/vol--41--no--1---lurking-in-the-sha
dows--the-supreme-court-s-qui/supremely-elite--the-lack-of-diversity-on-our-nations-highest-co.html
(discussing the "Court's distance from the lives of ordinary people").
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
43. See Lydia Saad, Conservative Lead in U.S. Ideology Is Down to Single Digits, GALLUP (Jan.

11, 2018), http://news.gallup.com/poll/225074/conservative-lead-ideology-down-single-digits.aspx
(of U.S. adults, 35% identify as conservative, 35% identify as moderate, 26% identify as liberal);
Jeffrey M. Jones, Democratic Party MaintainsEdge in Party Affiliation, GALLUP (Dec. 4, 2017),

http://news.gallup.com/poll/223124/democratic-party-maintains-edge-party-affiliation.aspx ("[B]ack
to the early 1990s, Democrats have averaged a five-point advantage over Republicans in party affiliation, with leads in all but four years.").
44. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Trump's First-YearJob Approval Worst by 10 Points, GALLUP (Jan. 22,

2018), http://news.gallup.com/poll/226154/trump-first-year-job-approval-worst-points.aspx ("President Donald Trump's job approval rating averaged 38.4% during his first year in office-slightly more
than 10 percentage points lower than any other elected president's first-year average."); Philip Bump,
The Senate may be developing an electoralcollege issue, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.

washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/04/10/the-senate-may-be-developing-an-electoral-colleg
e-issue/ ("[T]he Gorsuch nomination had support of senators representing 56.5 percent of the population, counting either senator's support as reflecting the entire population of the state-or 44.4 percent
of the population [counting each Senator as reflecting half the population of the state]. If you consider
that latter metric a better reflection of reality, it puts Gorsuch into an unusual position: Earning a
successful nomination to the bench despite his earning less than half of the support of the countryand appointed by a president who was similarly successful, thanks to the electoral college.").
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term of life tenure, that distance may grow for at least two reasons. First, the
public's views may change over time. For example, the public could become
more liberal or more conservative than the Justice was at appointment. It is
also possible that a Justice's views may change over time, but such "ideological drift" may be less common as presidents appoint candidates with more
durable sympathies.4 5 Second, the court's docket may change over time. For
example, a Justice appointed with popular views on one issue that predominates at appointment-say, executive power-may serve until another issue
on which he has unpopular views-say, criminal procedure-becomes a predominant issue facing the Court.4 6 With the loss of a bipartisan confirmation
process, the Court's few remaining institutional safeguards against politicization-including life tenure, elite credentials, and the constraining power of
precedent-risk increasing isolation for an "out of touch" court.
Consider President Franklin Roosevelt's campaign against the Supreme
Court, which culminated in his court-packing plan. 7 President Roosevelt
used rhetoric of "bring[ing] to the decision of social and economic problems
younger men who have had personal experience and contact with modem
facts and circumstances under which average men have to live and work." He

45. As many as half of Justices serving since 1937 showed "ideological drift" away from the appointing President, more often to the left than the right, which in theory could mitigate any ideological
disconnect. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme CourtJustices, 101 NW. U. L.

REv. 1883 (2007). A more recent assessment suggests that recent appointments may do a better job
at protecting against ideological drift, in part by requiring federal executive branch experience or other
signals of ideological dedication.

See Lee Epstein et al., President-ElectTrump and His Possible

Justices (Dec. 15, 2016), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/PresNominees2.pdf. That study notes that,
"[u]nlike Kennedy or Souter, neither of whom ever worked in Washington, Alito shows no signs of
drift or divergence," and suggests Justice Gorsuch is also unlikely to drift from his conservative positions. Id. at 12-13.
46. For example, take the Justices who preceded Justice Gorsuch in his seat. Justice Jackson was
appointed as a New Dealer who supported federal power, though he later articulated the leading doctrine of executive constraint. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), with Youngstown
Steel Co.v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Harlan was appointed
as a restraintist protege of Felix Frankfurter, though he eventually offered a leading articulation of
unenumerated rights doctrine. Compare Griffinv. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist
was appointed as a law-and-order conservative, though he became the leader of the New Federalism
and limited the scope of federal law, including criminal law. Compare New Yorkv. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984), with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Justice Scalia was appointed as a
champion of judicial restraint, though his originalism galvanized new rights restraints on the government. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 504 U.S. 905 (1989), with District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
47. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2002).

584

[Vol. 45: 575, 2018]

Hearing the States
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

targeted the "Four Horsemen" (Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler,
and Sutherland), three of whom were appointed by the opposition party, and
whose average tenure on the bench reached twenty years as of 1937.8 Although President Roosevelt's court-packing tactics failed, his court-attacking
strategy prevailed in consolidating a national majority of Americans to, in
Professor Bruce Ackerman's words, "endorse[] a break with their constitutional past," in part through transformative judicial appointments. 9
Excluding the obvious criteria of race and gender, the Four Horsemen
were relatively diverse for their time. Although they came from a different
generation than the governing class of the time, they at least brought a varied
range of persona and professional experiences from across the country.50
Compare how Justice Scalia described his colleagues on the bench in 2015:
Take, for example, this Court, which consists of only nine men and
women, all of them successful lawyers who studied at Harvard or
Yale Law School. Four of the nine are natives of New York City.
Eight of them grew up in east- and west-coast States. Only one hails
from the vast expanse in-between. Not a single Southwesterner or
even, to tell the truth, a genuine Westerner (California does not
count). Not a single evangelical Christian (a group that comprises
about one quarter of Americans), or even a Protestant of any denom1
ination.5
Only in such a group would Justice Neil Gorsuch, a Coloradan by birth (who

48. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937) (transcript available in The
American Presidency Project), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15381.
49. See Bruce A. Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1166, 1181
(1988).
50.

See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 111, 542-43,

848-49, 894-95 (Kermit L. Hall et al., 1992). James McReynolds was a Kentuckian graduate of the
University of Virginia Law School who practiced law in Nashville, unsuccessfully ran for Congress,
and served as President Wilson's Attorney General. Id. George Sutherland, born in England and
raised in Utah, graduated from University of Michigan Law School and practiced law in Utah before
serving in the House and Senate. Id. at 848-49. Willis Van Devanter, born in Indiana, graduated from
the University of Cincinnati Law School and practiced law in Wyoming before his appointment to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 894. Pierce Butler was a Minnesotan who read for the bar and
practiced law in his home state before his appointment to the Court. Id. at 111.
51. See Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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attended a Jesuit high school in the Washington suburbs, Columbia Univer-

sity, and Harvard Law School before a career in Washington, D.C.), add any
notable measure of cultural-if not racial or gender-diversity. 5 2
In historical terms, the current Supreme Court, while more diverse in
terms of race and gender, is less diverse by most other relevant measures. 53
According to a comprehensive study by Professor Benjamin Barton, "the Roberts Court Justices have spent more pre-appointment time in legal academia,
appellate judging, and living in Washington, D.C.," as well as in elite colleges
and law schools, "than any previous Supreme Court."54 Meanwhile, the Justices "have spent less time in the private practice of law, in trial judging, and
as elected politicians than any previous Court." 55 As Professor Barton argues,
this new "cloistered and detached" judicial elite is ill-equipped for the kind of
policymaking demanded by applying constitutional doctrine and interpreting
statutes. 5 6 A Court so "inexperienced" compared to the population it governs,
according to Professor Barton, leads to increased legal complexity, reduced
sensitivity to the impact of its decisions on ordinary people (even ordinary
litigants and jurors), and a distinct lack of practical wisdom.57 Professors
Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins suggest that to the extent Justices, and particularly swing Justices, are influenced by public opinion, elite groups predominate over the mass public. 5' This cultural disconnect only exacerbates
the ideological disconnect between the Court and the nation. 59
There are lawyers in the Supreme Court other than the Justices. 60 The
Justices' elite and increasingly like-minded clerks, however, are unlikely to

52. See Adam Liptak et al., For Court Pick, Painful Lesson from Boyhood, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2017, at Al.
53. See Benjamin H. Barton, An EmpiricalStudy ofSupreme CourtJustice Pre-AppointmentExperience, 64 FLA. L. REv. 1137, 1139-40 (2012).

54. Id. at 1138.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1139.
See id. at 1172-73, 1176-77.
See id. at 1176-85.

58. See Baum& Devins, supranote 8, at 1580 ("In light of what we can surmise about the Justices'
incentives, it seems reasonable to conclude that they are more susceptible to influence from elite
groups than from the mass public.").
59. See id. at 1580-81; see also Segall, supranote 41.
60. See, e.g., TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE
OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 1, 22-31 (2006).
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add significant ideological or cultural diversity to the chambers. 1 The advocates who argue before them, and the amici curiae who provide additional
background to a case, might round out the Justices' limited experiences.6 2 yet
a highly specialized Supreme Court Bar is reemerging for the first time since
the nineteenth century.6 3 This cohort "suffers" from the same elite Washington D.C. experiences as the Justices, and Chief Justice Roberts emerged from
it himself 64 Professor Richard Lazarus argues the consequences of the bar's
narrowing are "a Supreme Court docket and rulings on the merits [that are]
more responsive to [elite] economic concerns." 6 5 Those lawyers stand atop
an economy of influence to "push hard for amici support, generate stories in
the national news print and broadcast media, and prompt the publication of
op-eds in the nation's leading newspapers, all to coincide with the timing of
the Court's consideration of the cert petition."6 6 This elite "amicus machine"
network, as described by Professors Alison Orr Larsen and Neal Devins,6 7
wields impressive influence over the Court's docket.6 8 It does not, however,
ensure the Court's popular legitimacy.6 9 To the contrary, the well-heeled amicus bar offers the Justices the kind of special interest influence Washington
lobbyists offer members of Congress, without any of the popular electoral
checks on that influence. 70

61. See Devins & Baum, supra note 33, at 355 ("As measured by the lower-court judges from
whom the Justices draw their clerks, the tendency of Justices to take ideology into account has become
markedly stronger since the early 1990s, especially among conservative Justices."); see also PEPPERS,
supranote 60 (finding 94% of recent clerks were white, and 80% graduated from the same seven elite
law schools).
62. See Barton, supranote 53, at 1172-73 (arguing that the elite nature of the current Justices has
left them detached from legal reality and the public).
63.
ing the
64.
65.

See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: TransformCourt by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).
Cf id. at 1488-502.
See id. at 1554. But see Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L.

REv. 1901, 1941 (2016) ("We push back on the argument that the Supreme Court Bar is responsible
for producing a pro-business Court that favors the haves over the have-nots.").
66. See Lazarus, supra note 63, at 1525.
67. See Larsen & Devins, supranote 65, at 1935.
68. See Lazarus, supra note 63, at 1528 ("With amicus support, however, the odds [of the Court
granting a petition for certiorari]jump considerably [from approximately 2% in paid cases]. If there
was at least one amicus brief filed in support, the odds of certiorari being granted in October Term
2005 was just shy of 20%. If there were at least four amicus briefs filed in support of the paid petition,
the odds jumped even higher to 56%.").
69. See Larsen & Devins, supranote 65, at 1950-51.
70. See id. at 1907 ("Supreme Court specialists are experts in identifying ways in which a case is
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III. FEDERALISM AS A JUDICIAL SAFEGUARD FROM POLITICS
The Supreme Court is both too political and not political enough. The
current appointment and confirmation process extends partisan polarization
from the electorate to the Presidency, up Pennsylvania Avenue to the Senate,
and on across the street to the Supreme Court. Once seated, the Court itself
engages cases with major political impacts, direct and indirect.7 ' This raises
the stakes for the appointment and confirmation process, which drives increased political mobilization around the Court, and the vicious cycle continues. With the President likely to make appointments that could consolidate
an ideologically consistent bloc of Justices for a generation, these political
pressures will build for the foreseeable future. 7 2 At the same time, perhaps
motivated by the politicizing forces that demand safe (confirmable) and effective (consistent) appointees, the Court has never been so removed from the
public it serves. 73 It is no coincidence that the judicial purist's prayer "no
more Souters" 4 refers to the last Justice appointed with substantial practical
experience in state judicial and executive branches.75 Such a varied, pragmatic, and obviously relevant background is now a liability for an appointee
who lacks time in the political crucible of the federal executive branch or a
76
reliable paper trail from substantial federal judicial experience.

a good or bad vehicle to establish broad legal principles and, as such, the amicus machine helps the
Court identify which cases to hear and how to rule on those cases.").
71. See supra Section II.A.
72. See Roeder, supra note 26.
73. See infra notes 74-76.
74. See Adam Liptak, Trump 's Supreme CourtList: Ivy League Is Out, the HeartlandIs In, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 15, 2016, at A21 (quoting then-Alabama Attorney General, now Eleventh Circuit Judge,
William Pryor). Tulane graduate Judge Pryor's presence on President Trump's shortlist might suggest
a possible departure from the cultural homogeneity of recent appointees, though he was passed over
in favor of Judge Gorsuch. See id.
75.

See Adam Liptak, ObamaHas Chance to Select Justice with VariedResume, N.Y. TIMES (May

1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/02assess.html.
76.

See Souter, David Hackett, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/souter-david-

hackett. Justice Souter spent only five months on the First Circuit before his nomination to the Supreme Court. See id.; see generally Michael C. Dorf, Does FederalExecutive Branch Experience
Explain Why Some Republican Supreme CourtJustices Evolve'and Others Don't?, 1 HARV. L. & P.

REV. 45, 457 (2007) ("[A]n especially reliable predictor of whether a Republican nominee will be a
steadfast conservative or evolve into a moderate or liberal [is] experience in the executive branch of
the federal government. Those who lack such experience evolve; those who have it do not.").
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The Promises ofFederalism

A.

One way to reconcile the long-term ideology of the Supreme Court with
the fluctuating politics of the nation is federalism. Federalism is the classic
constitutional solution to reduce the costs of political contestation through
policy decentralization.7 7 Justice O'Connor, who like Justice Souter brought
experience from multiple branches of state government to the bench, offered
the Supreme Court's clearest articulation of this virtue: "[federalism] assures
a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of
a heterogenous society." 7' Because its central virtue is the accommodation of
political differences, its defenders span the ideological divide. 79 As Professor
Steven Calabresi explains, "[t]here is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is
more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document."" This is because federalism is designed, in Professor Michael McConnell's terms, to better "reflect the diversity of interests and preferences of individuals in different parts
of the nation."" Professor Akhil Amar agrees: "[S]tates can generate a wide
range of legislative policies that can accommodate sharply divergent local
needs and political preferences. "82 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky recognizes how
"[s]afeguarding community decisionmaking enhances diversity, as groups are
allowed to decide their own nature and composition," and suggests how this
primary value has been underemphasized in traditional accounts.8 3
A new generation of scholars continues to elaborate this important theme
of political accommodation through federalism. Leading this effort is Dean

77. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.").
78. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
79.

See Jeffrey Rosen, Federalismfor the Left andRight, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2017), http://www

.wsj.com/articles/federalism-for-the-left-and-the-right-14952 10904; infra notes 80-90.
80.

See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government ofLimited and EnumeratedPowers": In Defense of

United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 770 (1996).
81. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1493 (1987); see also John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalismvs. States'Rights:A Defense
ofJudicialReview in a FederalSystem, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 106 (2004) (stating that one of the key

benefits of federalism is "the satisfaction of diverse local preferences").
82. See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views ofFederalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L.

REv. 1229, 1236 (1994).
83.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values ofFederalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 536 (1995).
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Heather Gerken, who updates the argument for "second-order diversity" under various versions of federalism, and the ability of political minorities to
dissent by deciding." Professor Cristina Rodriguez identifies federalism's
value in negotiating political conflict by creating "multiple electorates-a design feature that channels the complexity of public opinion by creating varied
political communities with institutional features that can serve as vehicles for
the realization of multiple and contradictory preferences." 5 Professor Ernest
Young argues that "the need for federalism has radically increased as the
world has become more diverse, complex, and interconnected," particularly
in politically fraught "scenarios of profound national division." 8 6 Before President Obama appointed him to the First Circuit, Judge David Barron warned
of the costs of national legislation that preempts state policy development, in
terms of:
[C]utting off future outlets for social learning, reducing institutional
mechanisms that pressure the government to remain dedicated to
tackling underlying problems too fundamental to be solved in one fell
national swoop, or shrinking the public space for the kinds of citizen
participation and mobilization that are always the preconditions to
7
meaningful social change.
These new voices ensure that the theoretical foundations of federalism will
deepen as the Court further constructs its doctrine in the area.
Federalism also enjoys status as a central commitment of the current and

84. See HeatherK. Gerken, Second-OrderDiversity, 118 HARV.L.REV. 1099, 1161 (2005) ("Second-order diversity avoids a push to the preferences of the median decisionmaker in every case. Because second-order diversity varies the composition of decisionmaking bodies, we would expect variation in democratic outputs as well. Some democratic outputs will reflect the views of those in the
middle, while others will reflect the perspectives of those closerto the ends of the political spectrum.").
85.

Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism:Institutionaland Popular

Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2127 (2014).
86.

See Ernest Young, Federalism as a ConstitutionalPrinciple, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1057, 1060-

62 (2015) ("By giving groups that are out of power at the national level a chance to exercise power in
a state, federalism protects liberty in a third way: by fostering political circulation. Democracies lose
their freedom when a particular party or group secures a permanent lock on power ... But in America,
the out-party in Washington will always be running any number of states, and politicians from those
states can run for national office on a record of actual governing experience and achievement.").
87. David J. Barron, Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 1, 5 (2009).
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likely future Supreme Court majority, and possible supermajority. After Justice O'Connor articulated the federalism agenda," Chief Justice Rehnquist led
its most politically sensitive battles,8 9 and Justice Scalia consolidated its historical and structural foundations,9 0 the Roberts Court is following their lead.
The leading example of its commitment is The Health Care Cases.9 A full
seven members of the Court held that the Affordable Care Act's requirement
that states expand Medicaid eligibility "runs contrary to our system of federalism" in an unprecedented limitation of the general welfare spending power
with the anti-commandeering principle.9 2 Even the two dissenters invoked the
"interests of federalism," which they argued "are better served when States
retain a meaningful role in the implementation of a program of such importance."9 3 Chief Justice Roberts' lone lead opinion on the Commerce
Clause issue recognized, "[b]ecause the police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that
touch on citizens' daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed."9 4 Four other Justices agreed, although they
emphasized liberty rather than subsidiarity.9 5
Justice Gorsuch's record is thin on federalism, and one commentator suggests "he does not show the same fervor about federalism as he does about
separation of powers within the federal government."9 6 Yet in at least two
areas, preemption and the "dormant" commerce power, he took distinctive

88. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991).
89. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
90. See Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
91. See Nat'lFed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
92. Id. at 575-85 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer and Kagan, J.J.); see also id. at 68990 (opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J.) ("Seven Members of the Court agree that the
Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is unconstitutional.").
93. See id. at 630 (Ginsberg, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 536.
95. See id. at 658 (opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J.) ("[The individual mandate]
gives such an expansive meaning to the Commerce Clause that all private conduct (including failure
to act) becomes subject to federal control, effectively destroying the Constitution's division of governmental powers.").
96. See Kevin Russell, Judge Gorsuch on SeparationofPowers and Federalism, SCOTUS BLOG

(Mar. 15, 2017, 3:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuch-separation-powersfederalism/.
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9 7
pro-federalism positions as a judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Early signs from the Supreme Court suggest Justice Gorsuch will be committed advocate of federalism. In an early dissent for himself and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, Justice Gorsuch criticized the majority's opinion,
which addressed a seemingly technical issue of tolling under federal pendent
jurisdiction, for "no small intrusion on traditional state functions and no small
departure from our foundational principles of federalism."9 8 He concluded,
"Maybe we've wandered so far from the idea of a federal government of limited and enumerated powers that we've begun to lose sight of what it looked
like in the first place." 9 9 These words suggest a federalism agenda.
President Trump's pre-election list of twenty-one potential Supreme
Court nominees, prepared with the help of the Federalist Society and Heritage
Foundation, contains "committed judicial conservatives" who likely share the
Court majority's commitment to federalism.10 0 Notably, most of the potential
nominees come from the states rather than Washington, D.C., with about half
of the candidates drawn from state supreme courts, and relatively few carrying
the Harvard or Yale degrees that have monopolized the Court.101
Federalism, therefore, offers a second-best solution for both conservatives who can settle for limiting federal power in Washington, and liberals
who can settle for realizing progressive policies close to home, even if neither
can impose a national political agenda. With a prospect of a conservative
majority on the Supreme Court for decades, principled federalism may help
the Justices navigate through the possibility of an emerging center-left electorate. 10 2 Through federalism, a Court can police the constitutional structure
without erecting road blocks in the way of sustained policy development.1 0 3

97. See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1094 (10th Cir. 2015) (applying a strong
presumption against preemption to the Price-Anderson Act, and recognizing the presumption as "[a]
duty that is only 'heightened' where (as here) the area of law in question is one of traditional state
regulation like public health and safety" (citing Riegelv. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008)));
Energy & Env't Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a dormant commerce
clause challenge to a state's renewable energy mandate).
98. Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 608 (2018).
99. Id. at 617.
100. See Liptak, supra note 74.
101. See id.
102. See Ilya Somin, Trump, FederalPower, and the Left-Why Liberals Should Help Make Federalism Great Again, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-

conspiracy/wp/2016/12/05/trump-federal-power-and-the-left-why-liberals-should-help-make-federal
ism-great-again/?utm term=.89flea92379ff.
103. See id.
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"Rather than foreclose democratic outlets, federalism rulings can be circumvented by both Congress and the states," Professor Neal Devins explains, because "Congress can advance the same legislative agenda by making use of
another source of federal power," and interest groups "can also turn to the
states to enact state versions of the very law that Congress could not enact." 0 4
If federalism plays such a politically ameliorative role, it will not occur
simply because political actors recognize the value of federalism as such. For
these purposes, "federalism," the lawyerly rules of the political game, may be
distinguished from politically charged slogans like "states' rights."1 0 5 The latter, while highly salient with the public, often arise in individual rights issues
(e.g., race or abortion) that do not present the difficult structural judgments
where the states could best inform the Court.1 0 6 Unlike hotly contested and
often abstract debates over constitutional liberties, the structural technicalities
of federalism doctrine do not matter much to the electorate at large.
For these purposes, that is federalism's strength. 10 7 "[T]he Court's federalism decisions had no observable effect on public opinion," according to Professor Nathaniel Persily, because "[t]hey are simply too complex and obscure
to have altered the flimsy beliefs that most people have on the relevant issues." 08 The President and the Senate have their own agendas, and have little
reason to pay more than lip service to limitations on their own federal
power.1 0 9 The political branches may even embrace such limits to avoid accountability.110 As Professor William Marshall observed near the peak of the

104. Neal Devins, Congress and Judicial Supremacy, in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 65 (Bruce Peabody ed., 2011).
105. See generally Ernest A. Young, Symposium, Two Cheersfor ProcessFederalism, 46 VILL. L.

REv. 1349, 1351, 1353-55 (2001) (discussing "an 'ideal' theory of federalism, derived from some
basic structural imperatives in the Federalist Papers," which involves judicial review of both constitutional structure and individual rights).
106. See generally id. at 1353-55 (discussing an ideal federalism doctrine theory in which the judiciary reviews "polic[es] and maintain[s] the system of political and institutional checks," and is not
focused solely on individual rights cases).
107. See infra text accompanying note 108.
108. See Persily, supra note 19, at 10.
109. See Devins, supra note 104 ("For example, even though the Rehnquist Court invalidated more
federal statutes than any other Supreme Court, Congress did not see the Court's federalism revival as
a fundamental challenge to congressional power. Lawmakers instead preferred to appeal to their bases
by speaking out on divisive social issues-launching rhetorical attacks against lower federal courts
and state courts.").
110. See Mark A. Graber, The NonmajoritarianDifficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,
7 STUDIES IN Am. POL. DEV. 35, 43 (1993) ("[M]ainstream politicians may facilitate judicial policy-

making in part because they have good reason to believe that the courts will announce those policies
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Court's "new federalism" agenda, "the protection of the states through the

political processes in Washington is dead, or if not dead, is seriously ill."'
Precisely because federalism is a low salience issue among the electorate and
federal political elites, yet remains consistent with the Justices' jurisprudence,
it may offer the Court a powerful tool to accommodate political conflict without risk to the Court of falling victim to the conflict. 112 In other words, in the
current political culture, not only does federalism need the Court,113 but the
Court needs federalism, too.
B.

The Perils of Getting FederalismRight

The problem is, federalism is tricky. Federalism can be hard to apply in
a principled manner because it poses value-laden questions that tug at the
Court's ideological and institutional biases. Federalism arguments are structural arguments, with few clear anchors in constitutional text or practice. As
Professor Charles Black observed of McCulloch v. Maryland,' Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion on the state tax issue "has to do in great part with what he
conceives to be the warranted relational proprieties between the national government and the government of the states, with the structural corollaries of
national supremacy."'15 The textual locus of federalism, the Tenth Amendment,116 "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."' 17 No less a textualist than Justice Scalia observed when discerning
federalism's anti-commandeering rule in Printz v. United States, "[b]ecause
they privately favor but cannot openly endorse without endangering their political support.").
111. See William Marshall, American PoliticalCulture and the FailuresofProcess Federalism,22

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 144 (1998).
112. Consider a couple of highly technical cases that significantly advanced state sovereignty, and
associated federalism values, in regulatory and taxing spheres with low-profile but broad bi-partisan
support from the states. See, e.g., Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics, 134 S.Ct. 736 (2014)
(holding a state enforcement action is not a "mass action" removable to federal court under the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005); Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S.Ct. 973 (2017) (holding a
bankruptcy court must follow ordinary priority rules, including the special priority of state tax claims,
in structured dismissals under Chapter 11).
113. See Marshall, supra note 111, at 154 ("In this climate, judicial intervention is necessary if the
values of federalism are to be meaningfully protected.").
114. 17U.S.316(1819).
115. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15

(1969).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
117. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer . . must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court."" Appeals to
the structure of the Constitution, Professor Philip Bobbitt explains, "are
largely factless and depend on deceptively simple logical moves from the entire Constitutional text rather than from one of its parts . . . [t]hey embody a
macroscopic prudentialism drawing not on the peculiar facts of the case but
rather arising from general assertions about power and social choice."1 1 9
Take just a few examples of questions posed by current doctrine. What
kinds of activities are sufficiently economic or substantially affect interstate
commerce, 120 and how does a tradition of state regulation in the area matter? 121
What is necessary to the federal regulation of interstate commerce, 12 2 and what
is or is not proper to the same? 12 3 How does the Constitution protect the free
flow of interstate commerce in the absence of Congressional action, if at
all? 124 How broadly does federal law expressly, or can federal law impliedly,
preempt state law? 12 5 What is the scope of state sovereign immunity, 126 and
what kind of congruence and proportionality is required between a federal
civil rights law abrogating that immunity and the state injury it remedies? 127
Under what conditions may the federal government require states to enact or
administer federal policy in exchange for funding, 128 and when does persuasion give way to coercion? 129 What exactly is commandeering (or economic
dragooning), anyway?1 3 0
Beyond federalism proper, the determination of liberty interests under
substantive due process doctrine has long drawn on state law and practice.13 1

118. See 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
119. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 74 (1984).

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
laws).

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-17 (2000).
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
See Nat'lFed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559, 572 (2012).
See Dep't of Revenue ofKy. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338-39 (2008).
See Wyethv. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996).
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004).
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987).
See Nat'lFed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 582 (2012).
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913-14 (1997); cf Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 581-82.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-71 (2003) (counting states that abolished sodomy
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As the second Justice Harlan recognized, this practice also demands sensitivity to state interests, state autonomy, and any emerging state consensus: "the
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke."1 3 2 Professors Adam Pritchard and Todd Zywicki argue state-based
"[t]radition can provide a source of knowledge on which to base constitutional
judgments broader than the ephemeral and limited wisdom of a legislative
body or nine Supreme Court Justices."1 3 3 Professor Akhil Amar similarly asks
the Supreme Court to incorporate into its constitutional deliberations the values expressed in state constitutions as "deeper and more considered judgments
of the people themselves."1 3 4
These questions would be tough enough without the institutional loyalty
and ideological biases that work against the principled resolution of federalism questions. 13 5 Despite some Justices' apparent commitments to federalism,
the Court's federal institutional bias tends toward centralization (including
stronger enforcement of federal rights against states) and away from state autonomy (including weaker enforcement of limits on federal powers).13 6 This
bias includes the Justices' physical situation within the political culture of
Washington, D.C., during and almost always at some point before their appointments. 13 7 Federal executive branch service has become the preferred
proxy for ideological sympathy with the appointing president.1 3 8 Although
they tend not to articulate their views of federalism in jurisprudential terms,

132. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
133. Adam C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
Tradition'sRole in ConstitutionalInterpretation,77 N.C. L. REv. 409, 520 (1999) ("Common law

and state constitutional law are the products of a decentralized evolutionary process rooted in community preferences; as a result, the rules that develop will tend to be efficient, unanimity-reinforcing
principles, reflecting the expectations of the individuals residing in a given community.").
134. See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword:Lord Camden Meets Federalism-UsingState Constitutions
to CounterFederalAbuses, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 845, 861 (1996).

135. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. In a related trend, Judge (and former Ohio
State Solicitor) Jeffrey Sutton and Brittany Jones find "a material preference for federal cases over
state court cases over the last dozen years," potentially driven by similar institutional biases toward
federal courts. Jeffrey Sutton & Brittany Jones, The CertiorariProcess & State CourtDecisions, 131

Harv. L. Rev. F. (forthcoming 2018).
136. See Ilya Somin, The Impact ofJudicialReview on American Federalism:PromotingCentralization More than State Autonomy, in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR
UNITARISTS? 440, 477-80 (Nicholas Aroney & John Kincaid eds., 2017).
137. See Barton, supranote 53.
138. See Dorf, supra note 76.
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Senators from both parties understandably are jealous of their national policymaking powers in confirming Justices.1 3 9
What is worse, federalism easily takes on ideological valences that exacerbate rather than mitigate political polarization.140 Deregulatory commitments to broad readings of implied preemption or dormant commerce power
expanding federal authority, for example, might be paired uneasily with narrow readings of express powers limiting federal authority over commerce and
civil rights (or vice versa).' Professor Richard Hasen concludes that Justice
Scalia, in federalism cases and elsewhere, "purported to advocate a completely neutral approach that would lift the Court above the realm of politics,
but his inconsistency in applying it and his intense partisanship inside and
outside the Court tended to drag the institution into the muck."1 4 2 A broader

139. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States, 109th Cong. 158, at 3 (2005) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("I am concerned about
what I bluntly say is the denigration by the Court of Congressional authority."); id. at 5 (statement of
Sen. Leahy) ("When we discuss the Constitution's Commerce Clause or Spending Power, for example,
we are asking about Congressional authority to pass laws to ensure clean air and water and children's
and seniors' health, safe food and drugs, safe work places, even wetland protection and levees that
should protect our communities from natural disasters."); id. at 25 (statement of Sen. DeWine) ("Many
Americans are concerned when they see the Court strike down laws protecting the aged, the disabled
and women who are the victims of violence ... I must tell you, Judge, I too am concerned. Judges are
not members of Congress. They are not elected.").
140.

See JAYE. AUSTIN ET AL., REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO STATES IN SHAPING "OUR

FEDERALISM" 4-5 (Douglas T. Kendall ed., 2004) (identifying an ideological form of "libertarian federalism," that "has contributed to the polarization around this issue both on the Court (most federalism
cases have been the same five Justices in the majority and the same four Justices in dissent) and around
the country").
141. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve et al., Preemptionin the Rehnquist andRobertsCourts: An Empir-

icalAnalysis, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 353, 379 (2015) (finding the late Rehnquist Court "proved more
inclined to find federal preemption, largely because pro-preemption sentiments hardened among the
conservative justices"). "[O]ver time and especially under the Roberts Court, lawyerly preemption
questions have assumed a distinctly ideological flavor." Id. at 385. Counter to federalism stereotypes,
the liberal Justices are uniformly more likely to vote against preemption than the conservative Justices,
although within the conservative block and in unanimous cases, doctrinal rather than ideological factors appear to predominate. See id. at 381-85; see also Gregory M. Dickinson, An EmpiricalStudy of
Obstacle Preemptionin the Supreme Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682, 707-08 (2011) ("[W]hile the Court's

preemption decisions considered in the aggregate may fall generally along ideological lines, predictive
models based solely on judicial ideology miss an important determinant of legal decisions: doctrinal
disputes among the Justices.").
142.

See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS:

ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE

POLITICS OF DISRUPTION xii (2018). The contradictions include Justice Scalia's federalism jurispru-

dence. See id. at 134-37 (discussing as examples Bushy. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) and Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
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study by Professor Christopher Parker found that the Justices' substantive ideological commitments to policy override their structural ideological commitments to federalism, as "Justices are more strongly influenced by their beliefs
regarding the specific policies at hand than they are by their principles regarding the proper structure of government authority." 143
If doctrinal rigor can counter this attitudinal bias, states will need to help.
As Douglas Kendall wrote more than a decade ago, "[t]he Court will have to
sort out this tangled doctrine in cases," and states can offer a non-ideological
"outline of a federalism jurisprudence that is neither controversial nor chaotic,
a vision of federalism as a neutral principle.""' The Court, Kendall then
hoped, would take a path "moving toward federalism as a neutral principle,
and away from federalism as a political weapon."1 4 5 Some recent cases signal
a broadening ideological appeal of federalism on the Court.146 That ideological breadth safeguards the Court as well as our national politics.
IV. A

SOLUTION FROM THE STATES

Today's Supreme Court, within its narrow band of elite federal experience, needs help in making the value-laden prudential judgments that principled federalism demands. 1 7 The equally elite Washington D.C. advocacy and

143. See Christopher M. Parker, Ideological Voting in Supreme Court Federalism Cases, 19532007, 32 THE JUST. SYS. J. 206, 230 (2011) (finding that "liberal justices will be more likely to support

states' rights when the state policy is liberal, while conservative justices will increase their support for
the federal government when the state policy is liberal"); see also Brady Baybeck & William Lowry,
Federalism Outcomes and IdeologicalPreferences: The U.S. Supreme Court and Preemption Cases,

30 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 73, 96-97 (2000) ("Thus, counter to conventional wisdom, conservative
justices often vote for national preemption; liberal justices often vote for states' rights; national
preemption rulings may actually generate conservative outcomes; and decisions favoring states' rights
may actually produce liberal results.").
144. See AUSTIN ET AL., supranote 140, at 137.
145. See id. at 5.
146. See Ilya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 1, 15 (2016)

("[T]here is a deep ideological division overjudicial review of federalism inboth the legal and political
elite, and society more generally. That division is unlikely to disappear for some time to come. At
the same time, it is clear that the left-right theory cannot account for several important developments
in the Roberts Court's federalism cases, most notably the willingness of liberal justices to endorse
limits on federal power in a number of key cases. . . .").
147. See Chemerinsky, supra note 83, at 501 ("I believe that of all the areas of constitutional law,
discussions about federalism are the ones where the underlying values are least discussed and are the
most disconnected from the legal doctrines.").
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amicus bar is not well positioned to fill the blind spot."

Nor is the United

States, through the Solicitor General's office, which is duty bound to take
sides on federalism questions.149 There is one group of lawyers specially situated to help the Court develop a workable federalism faithful to the Constitution: the state attorneys general. If the primary virtue of federalism in these
politically polarized times is the accommodation of diverse policy preferences
in the states, then attorneys general are uniquely qualified to give voice to
those preferences in federalism litigation. 150
Attorneys general are well-established members of the Supreme Court
bar, both as counsel for states as parties in a substantial share of the Court's
criminal and civil rights docket, and also as a steadily increasing presence as
amici curiae.1 51 The Supreme Court first allowed state lawyers to represent
state interests in the nineteenth century, and by the 1880s "the Court began to
grant leave directly to state counsel to vindicate state rights." 152 By the 1910s,
the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and groups of attorneys general started to appear in cases as amicus curiae. 153
These early efforts met with mixed success, and filings of amicus briefs
remained relatively rare until the middle of the twentieth century.15' Amicus

148. See Larsen & Devins, supranote 65, at 1915-19.
149. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and
Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2113 (2015) (characterizing the support-

ive oath as "something that the Constitution requires of all state officers," and a "federal constitutional
duty to concede the invalidity of state laws," noting that a "broad reading of the supportive oath would
require all federal executives, including . . . the Solicitor General, to concede that the Constitution
trumps a federal statute or treaty whenever they have personally concluded that the latter was morelikely-than-not inconsistent with the Constitution").
150. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. Cities have the potential to give voice to diverse urban interests at the Court, too. See Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional
Enforcement, 47 HARV. CIV. RTS.-Civ. LIBERTIES L. REv. 1, 36 (2012) (arguing "that including local

public entities in constitutional debates may serve to strengthen those debates, along with the efficacy
of local governments and local public law offices"). Unlike states, however, cities lack an express
role in the constitutional structure, and do not comprehensively represent the nation-many Americans do not live in cities, but nearly all Americans live in a state. See id. at 43; see also U.S. Cities
are Home to 62.7 Percentofthe U.S. Population,but Comprise Just 3.5 PercentofLandArea, UNITED
STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb

15-33.html.
151. See generally Dan Schweitzer, "The Supreme Court of the United States", in STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (Emily Meyers, ed., 3d ed. 2013).
152. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.

694, 702 (1963).
153. See id. at 706.
154. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus Curiae Briefs on the
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appearances by the states and other interested organizations, notably the
ACLU and AFL-CIO, as well as the Solicitor General of the United States,
steadily increased until, as Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill
find, "cases without amicus briefs have become nearly as rare as cases with
amicus briefs were at the beginning of the century."155 At mid-century, the
states struggled in their encounters with the Warren Court, winning a little
more than one-third of the cases in which they appeared from 1954 to 1970,
but from 1970 to 1989 the states' side prevailed in more than half of the cases
in which states appeared. 156 Today, attorneys general appear before the Supreme Court on behalf of states more often, and prevail in a higher percentage
of their cases, than any other advocacy group, save the United States.1 5 7
The states' turnaround can be traced to 1982.151 After sharp criticism
from the Court about the poor quality of state lawyering, attorneys general
developed a Supreme Court advocacy project within NAAG, which monitored, coordinated, and improved state advocacy in the Supreme Court.15 9 The
move coincided with the low point ofjudicially enforced federalism in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority. 160 Justice Scalia noted how
early in his tenure, before professionalization of state appellate advocacy,
states at the Court "were throwing away important points of law, not just for
their state, but for the other 49"161 Douglas Ross, founder of the NAAG Su162
preme Court Project, called for more effective state voices at the Court.

Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743, 744 (2000).
155. See id. at 744, 753 n.25 ("[T]he States filed amicus briefs in 4.13%, 5.11%, 12.64%, 19.47%,
and 29.64% of all cases (for a total of 14.5 1%)."); Richard C. Kearney & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Decision Making: The Impact of Court Composition on State and Local Government

Litigation, 54 J. POL. 1008, 1011 (1992) (finding state and local government appearances "have
trended upward, from a low of 20 cases in 1955 to a high of nearly 140 cases in 1986"); ERIc N.
WALTENBURG & BILL SWINFORD, LITIGATING FEDERALISM: THE STATES BEFORE THEU.S. SUPREME
COURT 62 (1999) ("[T]here has been an appreciable increase in state participation before the Court as
[petitioners]-more than one case per term" from 1954 to 1989).
156. See WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 155, at 107.
157. See Schweitzer, supra note 151, at 405; see also WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 155,
at 77.
158. See Douglas Ross, Safeguarding Our Federalism: Lessonsfor the States from the Supreme
Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 723, 727 (1985).
159. See id.

160. 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see Ross, supra note 158, at 726-27.
161. See Jennifer Senior, In Conversation:Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 6, 2013, at 12, 2013
WLNR 25103681.
162. See Ross, supra note 158, at 730.
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"Just as advocacy organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union,
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and even the solicitor general's office, are
effective watchdogs for their clients' interests at the court, so the states should
have guardians of their interests on watch," Ross argued, "[t]o maximize the
effectiveness of the states' role in making 'Our Federalism' a reality." 163
The initiative worked by cultivating the development of appellate experts
in attorney general offices modeled after the Solicitor General of the United
States. 164 Now, thirty-nine states have such offices, and another seven states
have similar appellate experts serving the attorney general. 165 These lawyers
form an "outside the beltway" elite of "highly credentialed attorneys."166
More than half of them attended elite law schools, nearly forty percent clerked
on federal courts of appeals, and nearly one in five clerked on the Supreme
Court. 16 7 Unlike their elite counterparts in the Washington, D.C. bar, however, they also bring significant geographic and demographic diversity from
offices spread across the states. 16 8 Professor David Fontana explains how such
geographically decentralized offices can increase the accountability and competence of officials by "expos[ing] them to more argument pools
and . . plac[ing] them in different reputational networks." 169 Even among
officials within the same party, "[e]mpowering decentralized officials . . . can
generate cross-cutting ideological pressures across and within the branches
regardless of whether the branches are controlled by the same parties or different parties."1 70 These positive effects of decentralization, which Professor
Fontana identifies within the federal government, would be amplified among
the state attorneys general, assuming their coordination does not become a

163. Id.
164. See generally James R. Layton, The Evolving Role of the State Solicitor: Toward the Federal

Model?, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 533 (2001) (discussing how a state solicitor's role and function
closely mirrors that of the U.S. Solicitor General).
165. See Memorandum from Dan Schweitzer, States with Solicitors General, (March 2017) (memorandum on file with author).
166. See Lazarus, supra note 63, at 1501.
167. See Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, State CoordinatingInstitutions and Agenda Setting
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 Aim.POL.RES. 819, 823 (2012).

168. See infra text accompanying notes 169-71. For example, in 1996 nearly half of attorneys
representing states were women, while 90% of attorneys representing other parties were male. See
Layton, supra note 164, at 533 n.1.
169. See David Fontana, FederalDecentralization, 103 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manu-

script at 40), available at https://ssm.com/abstract=3 029180.
170. Id.
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channel for centralization along partisan or other lines.171
A.

How States Can Give Voice to Federalism

States succeed at the Supreme Court because the Court pays attention to
the states. 172 Even when states "were not generally regarded for their outstanding legal expertise," according to a survey of Supreme Court clerks by
Professor Kelly Lynch, "the Court's concern for the states as an integral component of the American system of government" merits the Court's consideration of state amicus briefs. 173 Unlike most amici curiae, the number of states
on a brief matters to the Court, suggesting attorneys general play a quasi-representative role."1 7 In another survey, a Justice noted that the number of amici
curiae is generally of little or no consequence, "unless it is from many of the
states." 1 75 Especially at the petition stage, these briefs "often emphasize how
granting a particular case will reduce uncertainty and better allow the states to
address important policy issues. "176 The current Court is highly receptive to
these arguments, granting certiorari in nearly half of cases supported by state
amicus briefs, compared to less than one in twenty petitions filed by other

171. See id.; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, 127 HARV. L. REv. 1077, 1097

n.69 (2014) (noting that the states can have divided governments-an attorney general and a governor
from different parties-but unified party governments are more prevalent).
172. See Schweitzer, supranote 151, at 407-08.
173. See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae

Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 48 (2004).
174. See Sean Nicholson-Crotty, State MeritAmicus ParticipationandFederalism Outcomes in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 37 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 599, 609 (2007) (stating that "participation is asso-

ciated with a significant and substantive increase in support for state power by the Court, at least when
states act together by filing numerous briefs or cosigning individual briefs advocating that outcome");
see also Cornell W. Clayton & Jack McGuire, State Litigation StrategiesandPolicymaking in the U.S.

Supreme Court, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 30 (2001) ("NAAG's coalitional strategy appears to
have been effective at improving state levels of success during the mid- and late 1980s."); Douglas
Ross & Michael W. Catalano, How State and Local Governments Faredin the United StatesSupreme

Courtfor the PastFive Terms, 20 URB. LAW. 341, 347 (1988) (finding that over five years of criminal
procedure cases (1982-1986), state litigants are more likely to win when other states filed amicus
briefs supporting their position on the merits); Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme
Court: State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae, 70 JUDICATURE 298, 305 (1987) ("Increased coor-

dination of state amicus activity as part of an overall effort to improve state advocacy has apparently
been successful in increasing state participation.").
175. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study ofAmici Curiae in Federal Court:A Fine
Balance ofAccess, Efficiency, andAdversarialism,27 REv. LITIG. 669, 689 n.89 (2008).

176. Goelzhauser & Vouvalis, supranote 167, at 824.
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lawyers.1
As one may expect, the states' voices are most prominent, and most effective, in federalism cases. As a law clerk noted, "there is an institutional
interest in taking state concerns seriously because of federalism concerns."
Professors Margaret Lemos and Kevin Quinn explain, "state AG briefs can,
at a minimum, serve a signaling function for the Court, alerting the Justices to
federal laws and regulations (or, in the case of the dormant Commerce Clause,
other states' laws) that trench on important state interests." 179 Even before the
rise of the New Federalism in the 1990s, more than ninety percent of state
amicus briefs supported state power. 80 Conversely, when states are conflicted
or uniformly oppose a federalism-based claim during the same period, Professor Nicolson-Crotty finds "the Court's ruling always favors nationaliza-

tion." 181
It is no surprise that states' fortunes improved at the Supreme Court with
the appointment of Justices more friendly to federalism, though the mechanism is complicated. 18 2 States are both recognizing and reinforcing the profederalism trend at the Court.1 83 Professors Waltenburg and Swinford suggest
"presidential appointments, state litigation proficiency, Court decisions, and
state litigation actions form an interrelated causal structure wherein a force
producing a change in one element will reverberate through the whole system." 8 4 While the ideological trend of the Justices accounts for part of the

177. See Schweitzer, supranote 151, at 407-08.
178. Lynch, supra note 173, at 48.
179. Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, LitigatingState Interests: Attorneys GeneralasAmici,

90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1233 (2015).
180. See Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 174, at 604.
181. See id. at 609.
182. See Paul Chen, The InstitutionalSources ofState Success in Federalism Litigation Before the

Supreme Court, 25 LAW & POL'Y 455, 466 (2003) (noting how the appointment of conservative Justices has helped state policy interests); see also WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 155.

183. See Chen, supranote 182 ("The Court's federalism decisions are important ... because they
are legal precedents that may be invoked to effect a fundamental restructuring of the current balance
of power between the federal government and the states . . . [t]herefore, state political and legal actors .. . will have an incentive to continue litigating cases that they think will advance their policy
interests."); Brandon D. Harper, The Effectiveness of State-FiledAmicus Briefs at the United States

Supreme Court, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1503, 1509 (2014) ("Given the increasing research on the effectiveness of amicus briefs, it is no surprise that states are becoming more involved.").
184. See WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 155; see also Harper, supra note 183, at 1521

(suggesting three mechanisms of increased state influence: "First, the Court may rely more heavily on
state-filed briefs because the attorneys general are seen as experts on the legal issues affecting their
states, and collective statements of a large number of attorneys general may weigh in favor of a closer
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reemergence of judicially enforced federalism over the past three decades, the
states themselves are responsible for catalyzing that trend. Professor Paul
Chen observes, "the recent federalism decisions are more likely the product
of litigation sustained over many cases and spanning a period of time rather
than simply the pro-state Justices on the Court reaching out to decide particu5
lar cases to advance their pro-state policy preferences."1 8
There remain blind spots, however, in the Court's approach to federalism,
and the states offer the Court a credible and politically legitimate source of
arguments to help it get federalism right.186 At about the time the dissenters
in Garcia lamented the majority's fallback on the political safeguards of federalism, "rejecting the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from federal overreaching,"' 7 the state attorneys general were developing a hybrid
model of federalism enforcement. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky recognized early
in the New Federalism movement that political safeguards of state interests
can find expression through the judicial process, where "advocates before a
court may argue the importance of states' interests as a consideration in judicial decisionmaking."' In Garcia,the dissenters complained:
The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct
election of Senators), the weakening of political parties on the local
level, and the rise of national media, among other things, have made
Congress increasingly less representative of state and local interests,
and more likely to be responsive to the demands of various national

analysis of their arguments. Second, the Court may be more concerned with the broader implications
of its rulings now that there are more perspectives in the room. Finally, that the Court is relying more
on state-filed briefs may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, state attorneys general are more successful because they are more frequent litigants").
185. Chen, supra note 182, at 466; see also id. at 458 ("These changes themselves are the product
of broader developments in the American political regime, and include the following: (1) the diminishing effectiveness of the states' lobbying power in the federal policymaking arena over the last three
decades; (2) the increasing effectiveness of litigation by states' attorneys general (SAGs) in the federal
judicial arena because of increased skill, funding, and coordination of litigation strategies among
SAGs; and (3) the convergence of these changes resulting in a pro-state agenda on the Supreme
Court.").
186. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 140, at 63 ("The Court errs, according to the states, when it
inappropriately concludes that to protect the states it must limit the ability of the federal government
to play a role in addressing national problems. The Court errs even more seriously in ignoring the
states' pleas for reform of judicial doctrines under the Supremacy Clause and the dormant Commerce
Clause that inappropriately limit state experimentation.").
187. Garciav. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S 528, 567 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
188. See Chemerinsky, supranote 83, at 510.
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constituencies.1 8 9
Yet popularly elected attorneys general appearing in the Supreme Court,
sworn to uphold their state constitutions as members of state government, can
serve as an imperfect analogy to legislatively elected Senators appearing in
Congress before the Seventeenth Amendment.1 9 0 The attorneys general offer
a distinct voice to state interests in Court, and the Court is ready to listen.1 9 1
Attorneys general are uniquely positioned to advance federalism arguments that bridge the distance between the Justices and the people in the
states. 19 2 All but seven attorneys general are elected separately from the governor and other state executive officers.1 9 3 They owe legal and political duties
to the state as a client and to their constituencies, respectively.1 9 4 Professor
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard explains that, in the context of health care reform,
state officials are institutionally oriented to "[f]ram[e] objections to substantive polices in terms of states' rights, even when state interests seemingly are
not implicated," and "vocalize[] constituents' views on the merits of the new
federal law."1 9 5 The legal process can mitigate political pressures, for example, because attorneys general "appoint as state solicitors those on whom they
can rely not for political guidance, but for reasoned legal advice pertinent to
appeals," which can "counteract the political pressures often felt by attorneys
general when they make appellate decisions."1 9 6
Politics has had its place in the rise of the attorneys general at the Supreme
Court, of course. Substantive ideological commitments, typically marked by
party affiliation, run across state lines. This is particularly likely to occur in
the relatively low-cost decision to join amicus briefs initiated by other

189. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9.
190. See generally Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys

General as NationalPolicymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525 (1994) (discussing the role of state attorneys
general as national policymakers).
191. See id. at 529.
192. See id. at 531-33.
193. See id. at 530. Forty-three states elect the attorney general. Id. The governor appoints the
attorney general in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming. Id. The legislature
appoints the attorney general in Maine, and the state supreme court appoints the attorney general in
Tennessee. Id.; see also STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (Emily Mey-

ers, ed., 3d ed. 2013).
194. See Clayton, supra note 190, at 530.
195. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Fed-

eral Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 165 (2010).
196. See Layton, supranote 164, at 550-5 1.
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states. 19 7 In criminal procedure cases from 1970 through 2009, for example,
Professors Shane Gleason and Colin Provost found institutional resources
dominated a state's decision to initiate amicus briefs, while partisanship
played a limited role in a state's decision to join another state's amicus brief,
with Republicans predictably siding with law enforcement more than Democrats.1 98 Sometimes, states break from the expected "pro-state" position due
to broader ideological commitments.1 99 A notable early example is Minnesota
Attorney General (and later Senator, Vice President, and Ambassador) Walter
Mondale's amicus brief joined by twenty-two states on the side of the petitioner, and against their sister state Florida, in Gideon v. Wainwright.20 0 Traditionally, however, these cross-cutting commitments (whether partisan or
ideological) did not usually find expression in state attorney general briefs. 201
Instead, until recently states sat out of "such controversial areas as race and
sex discrimination, abortion, freedom of speech and press, and church-state
relations." 20 2
In most cases, institutional loyalty to state interests plays an important
role in Supreme Court advocacy. 20 3 In a thorough study of attorney general
behavior before the Supreme Court, Professors Margaret Lemos and Kevin
Quinn find "AGs are asserting a variety of interests on behalf of their statesnot just the abstract institutional interests typically at issue in debates over
federalism, but a range of regulatory interests as well." 20 4 The office of the

197. See Clayton, supra note 190, at 544 ("Unlike when states are party to a suit, the decision to
participate as amicus curiae is determined largely by the personal interests and felt political pressures
on individual attorneys general. Changes in the institutional role of the office should therefore be
reflected by trends in state amicus activity.").
198. See Shane A. Gleason & Colin Provost, Representing the States Before the U.S. Supreme
Court: State Amicus BriefParticipation,the Policy-making Environment, and the FourthAmendment,
46 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 248, 267-70 (2016); see also, Colin Provost, An IntegratedModel of U.S.
State Attorney GeneralBehaviorin Multi-StateLitigation, 10 STATE POLITICS & POL'Y Q. 1, 4 (2010)

(finding, in study of state consumer protection litigation, that "electoral factors might matter more than
factors related to the public interest").
199. See Clayton, supra note 190, at 544.
200. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Morris, supra note 174, at 300.
201. See Morris, supranote 174, at 302.

202. See id. at 303.
203.

Cf David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, InstitutionalLoyalties in ConstitutionalLaw, 85 U. CHI. L.

REv. 1, 11 (2018) ("Our focus on these inter-branch relations means we must sideline the related but
distinct question of federalism as a cockpit in which institutional loyalty also plays a potentially salient
function.").

204. Lemos & Quinn, supranote 179, at 1247.
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attorney general is designed to express those interests through legal advocacy
that channels partisan motivations. 20 5 As lawyers with a duty to the state's
overall policy agenda, attorneys general must discern that agenda in the complicated ideological commitments of its electorate as filtered through the
state's constitution and laws, 206 as well as broader economic and social interests. 20 7 Attorneys general, particularly elected attorneys general, enjoy substantial political latitude to determine their states' interests in Supreme Court
amicus briefing, independent of state political elites including interest groups
and other elected officials. 208 Professors Lemos and Quinn find "not just that
partisanship does not provide a full explanation-i.e., that AG behavior is
consistent with partisan motivations," but "in the sizeable group of cases in
which AG coalitions are bipartisan, it appears that some AGs are acting contrary to partisan motivations." 2 09
Even where politics predominates, partisan contestation can ensure states
provide diverse perspectives on the issues before the Supreme Court. 2 10 Professors Lemos and Quinn find "Democrat and Republican AGs alike seem to
seek out cases in which they are not forced to choose between their preferred
policy outcomes and the long-term institutional prerogatives of the states they
represent." 2 11 Moreover, it is a fallacy of composition to suppose that partisanship at the state level necessarily amounts to partisanship at the national

205. See id. at 1265-66 ("Different officials may experience partisan motivations in different ways,
and those motivations may or may not be counterbalanced by the competing imperatives of the officials' institutional roles and professional commitments . . . [T]he fact that AGs are legal advocates
may play a role in explaining [nonpartisan behavior injoining amicus briefs]."); see also Harper,supra
note 183, at 1516 (identifying attorney general motivations as "1) a genuine interest to affect the law
of federalism; 2) a desire to affect the outcomes of cases even where the state is not directly involved
in the case or controversy or is unable or unwilling to bear the expense of litigating as a party; or 3)
politics").
206. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 149, at 2153.
207.

See, e.g., WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supranote 155, at 72-73 (identifying regional patterns

in state amicus brief coalitions).
208. See Colin Provost, When to Befriend the Court? Examining State Amici CuriaeParticipation

Before the U.S. Supreme Court, l IST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 4, 23 (2011) (suggesting, based on a study of
criminal procedure cases between 1990 and 2001, that, like an attorney general's constituents, "elites,
such as the governor and police groups, do not monitor amicus participation in Supreme Court cases
very closely either, and as a result, AGs are largely free to participate according to their own evaluation
of the case").
209. Lemos & Quinn, supranote 179, at 1263.
210. See id. at 1254-56 (discussing the diversity of issues before the Supreme Court and their correlation with partisanship and polarization).
211. See id. at 1257. Republican attorneys general predominate in federalism cases seeking to limit
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level, at least as long as state partisanship does not simply mirror national
partisanship.2 1 2 Professor Adam Bonica's study of campaign finance contributions finds attorneys general to be slightly more polarized than other state
officials, but also demonstrates they are more balanced as a group across the
ideological spectrum than other state or federal elected officials, state courts,
or even federal circuit court judges. 21 3 This capacity for ideological balance,
both within a single attorney general office and across the states, enhances the
states' credibility. 214 When states muster ideologically balanced coalitions in
amicus briefs supporting certiorari petitions, the Supreme Court is more likely
to take the case. 2 15 In a study of states as parties, Professors Ryan Owens and
Patrick Wohlfarth find those states that "design formal legal institutions to
foster increased appellate litigation expertise and credibility . .. are better able
to protect their interests before the Court and thereby preserve the policies of
state legislators."216
Conversely, even the unmatched credibility of the Solicitor General of the
United States suffers when the office takes positions disproportionately supporting the President's political agenda rather than the more complicated set
of policy valences reflected in the federal laws the Solicitor General has a duty
to uphold. 2 17 In one recent argument, for example, Chief Justice Roberts

national regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, for example, while Democratic attorneys general predominate in federalism cases seeking to limit national deregulatorypower through preemption.
Compare, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), with Williamson v. Mazda
Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (2011).
212. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Foreword:System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV.

L. REv. 4, 7 (2009) ("[M]ultiple failures of the ideal can offset one another, producing a closer approximation to the ideal at the level of the overall system.").
213.

See Adam Bonica, Mapping the IdeologicalMarketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. ScI. 367, 376-78

(2014).
214. See Kevin C. Newsom, The State Solicitor GeneralBoom, A.B.A. SEC. OF LITIG. (Mar. 14,

2013) ("[S]tates are not 'one-off' litigants. They are institutional litigants-repeat players-and they
have concrete long-term interests .. . One of a state solicitor general's chief tasks is to coordinate and
unify the state's litigation program so as to maximize the state's effectiveness as a legal policymaker.").
215. See Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, Amicus Coalition Heterogeneity and Signaling
Credibility in Supreme CourtAgenda Setting, 45 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 99, 107 (2014) ("[T]here

is a strong relationship between the level of preference heterogeneity among lobbying states at the
agenda setting stage and the probability of the Supreme Court granting review. This suggests that
heterogeneous lobbying coalitions are better able to convey credible signals about case importance.").
216. Ryan J. Owens & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, State Solicitors General, Appellate Expertise, and
State Success Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 657, 682 (2014).
217. See Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Tenth Justice? Consequences ofPoliticization in the Solicitor
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called a change in the federal government's position "a little disingenuous,"
rejecting the standard explanation for such shifts: "It wasn't further reflection.
We have a new secretary under a new administration."21 8 Reporter Adam
Liptak notes lawyers in the Solicitor General's office jokingly concede that
"'upon further reflection' actually means 'upon further election. "'219 The
Court may not be as attuned to similar shifts in any one state's position, unlike
the United States, and a bipartisan coalition of states can lend credibility that
any single partisan office may lack. 2 20 As former Alabama Solicitor General
Kevin Newsom explains, "if a state does not speak with a unified voice to the
courts in which it routinely appears . .. those courts will grow frustrated with
the state's flip-flopping and count it against the state's credibility. And that,
of course, can be a death-blow." 22 1
B.

How PartisanshipCan Distort the States' Voices

The states cannot be part of the solution to national partisan polarization,
however, if those forces of polarization extend to the state level. If that occurs,
it may cost the states' credibility at the Supreme Court, obstructing both the
states' and the Court's path to a principled federalism over time. Despite the
institutional advantages of attorneys general discussed above, there are worrying indications that state attorneys general may be unable to resist what Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen recently termed "partisan federalism," in which
the states' resistance to federal power serves primarily as a vehicle for national
partisan policy mobilization and countermobilization. 22 2 Partisan contestation
among states can be a constructive force in sharpening arguments for principled federalism, but, where partisan federalism predominates, distinct state

General's Office, 71 J. POL. 224, 235 (2009) ("Not only are the justices more apt to ignore amicus
arguments when faced with a politicized S.G., but now a solicitor general perceived as politically
biased also stands to jeopardize success when defending positions with a direct governmental interest
at stake.").
218. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88 (2013)
(No. 11-1285).
219.

Adam Liptak, Trump's Legal U-TurnsMay Test Supreme Court'sPatience,N.Y. TimES (Aug.

28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/us/politics/trump-supreme-court.html.
220. See Goelzhauser & Vouvalis, supra note 215, at 103 (arguing that "heterogeneous state amicus
coalitions are more likely to be successful at convincing the Supreme court to grant review," while
stating that "[fformer Supreme Court clerks have suggested that state-filed amicus briefs, and filing
by 'group of states' in particular, are afforded special weight by the Court") (internal citation omitted).
221. Newsom, supra note 214.
222. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 171, at 1080.
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2 23
interests are at risk of becoming subsumed under national partisan debates.
This trend toward increasing partisanship began around the year 2000.224
At the end of the Clinton administration in 1999, responding to the states'
successful bipartisan mobilization against the tobacco industry, Alabama Attorney General (now Eleventh Circuit Judge and potential Supreme Court
nominee of President Trump) William Pryor founded the Republican Attorneys General Association ("RAGA") to coordinate fundraising and litigation
on a partisan axis. 225 Later, Republicans folded the state-level association into
the national Republican Party as an affiliate, although it recently split off again
to exert more control over fundraising. 226 Democrats followed suit at the beginning of the George W. Bush administration in 2002 with the Democratic
Attorneys General Association ("DAGA"), though it maintained organizational independence from the national Democratic Party. 227
The impact of these associations' increased efficiency in fundraising for
attorneys general, and associated influence in coordinating state litigation

223. See id. at 1096-1108 (discussing partisan federalism and outlining three main ways that states
and their national allies contest national policy of the opposing party).
224. See Lemos & Quinn, supra note 179, at 1265 ("The increase in partisanship in the post-2000
coalitions is striking ... The greater the ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans, the
harder it may be for AGs from the two parties to come together onjoint briefs.").
225.

See George Lardner Jr. & Susan Schmidt, Attorneys GeneralRaise Funds for GOP, WASH.

POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at A01 ("Republican state attorneys general are soliciting large contributions
from corporations that are embroiled in-or are seeking to avert-lawsuits by states.").
226.

See Ben Wieder, Big Money Comes to State Attorney-GeneralRaces, THE ATLANTIC (May 8,

2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/us-chamber-targets-dems-in-state-attom
ey-general-races/361874/. The RAGA joined the Republican National Committee's affiliate the Republican State Leadership Committee in 2002. See id. ("The Democratic Attorneys General Association came into existence three years after RAGA-the same year RAGA was folded into the
RSLC . .. ."). In 2014, the RAGA regained independence and control over its substantial treasury.
See Alexander Bums, Powerful GOP Group Splits Apart, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2014, 4:23 PM),
https://www.po

litico.com/story/2014/0 1/republican-state-leadership-committee-split-102443 (discussing how, unlike
down-ballot races, "[a]ttorney general races are natural destinations for corporate and big-donor cash,
given the broad discretion these officials have when it comes to initiating legal action").
227.

See Steven Mufson, ConservativesPourMoney Into Racesfor State Attorneys General,WASH.

POST (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/conservative -groupspour-money-into-races-for-state-attomeys-general/2016/09/23/7a57030c-7e86-11e6-8dl3-d7c7O4ef
9fd9_story.html?utm term=.3a33e5568d60 ("Founded in 2002, the Democratic Attorneys General
Association has recently added offices in San Francisco and Washington, and in May hired its first
full-time executive director, veteran political strategist Sean Rankin."); see also Rachel M. Cohen,
The Hour ofthe Attorneys General, THE AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 22, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/h

our-attomeys-general (noting that DAGA is disconnected from the national democratic party).
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agendas, became clear to a new generation of state advocates. 228 When former
Colorado Attorney General John Suthers joined the ranks of state attorneys
general after serving as a United States Attorney, he found:
[T]he attorneys general are subject to intense lobbying in much the
same fashion as legislators. But instead of seeking your vote, the
lobbyists are hoping that you will or will not sign on to amicus curiae
briefs in the appellate courts, or more importantly, that they can convince you to refrain from initiating or joining a lawsuit against their
company or their interests. 229
Those interests also exert influence through million-dollar fundraising efforts
from business and trial lawyer interests. 23 0 The RAGA claims both it and its
Democratic counterpart raised more than $30 million total for the thirty attorney general elections to be held in 2018, a significant amount for less expensive "second tier" statewide campaigns. 2 3 1

228. See JohnW. Suthers, The State Attorney General'sRole in Global Climate Change, 85 DENV.

U. L. REv. 757, 759 (2008) ("In March of 2005 I attended my first meeting of the National Association
of Attorneys General (NAAG) in Washington, D.C. In the weeks prior to the meeting I was flooded
with invitations to go to elegant private dinners and social receptions hosted by law firms for various
interest groups while I was in Washington. That is not something that occurred when I went to district
attorney or U.S. Attorney meetings ... I learned that many companies and interest groups contributed
to both RAGA and DAGA. I recall being a bit perplexed. What was the propriety and necessity of
such an effort to influence attorneys general?").
229. Id.
230. See Wieder, supranote 226 ("[W]hile the organizations [RAGA and DAGA] share many of
the same top donors, there are some stark differences in the levels of giving and their overall spending.
The Chamber's giving to the RSLC, for example, has been more than 100 times greater than its giving
to the DAGA from 2003 through 2013. Tobacco companies, most notably Reynolds American and
Altria, have given more than $7.5 million to the RSLC, compared to just over $500,000 to the DAGA.
At the same time, trial lawyers have given the DAGA more than $4.5 million in that same time period.
That's $3 million more than they've given to the RSLC.").
231.

See About RAGA, REPUBLICAN ATT'ys GEN. Ass'N, http://www.republicanags.com/about

(last visited Mar. 4, 2018) ("RAGA has repeatedly shown to be a strong vessel for fundraising. In
2016, RAGA's political spending totaled over $14 million. For the cycle to date, RAGA has raised
$23.2 million. That number overwhelms the $8.2 million raised by the Democratic Attorney General
Association in the same period."); see also Democratic Attorneys GeneralAssociation Breaks FundraisingRecord in 2017, DEMOCRATIC ATT'Y'S GEN. Ass'N, https://democraticags.org/daga-breaks-

fundraising-record/ ("The Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA) today announced record-breaking fundraising in 2017: 7.6 million across all platforms-more than $2.4 million above
2016 numbers and $3 million more than 2015. Commitments to DAGA for 2018 indicate this upward
trend in fundraising will continue, as the Democratic Attorneys General Association increasingly garners public recognition and media interest.").
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This partisanship hit an inflection point during the Obama administration.
For example, Republican attorneys general mobilized against the Obama administration and in support of gun rights; Democratic attorneys general mobilized in support of the Obama administration and in support of marriage
rights. 23 2 Professor Paul Nolette's comprehensive study of state litigation over
this period concludes:
As the line between national and state politics became increasingly
blurred, AGs began defining their states' interests in increasing partisan and nationalized terms. This has left fewer issues in which there
are clearly discernible and unified state interests conflicting with
those of the federal government. Instead, AGs have alternated between broadly describing state interests as either the necessity of protecting state policy autonomy or upholding the interests of their individual citizens against government (state or federal) overreach,
depending on the nature of the underlying policy dispute. 23 3
In perhaps the boldest manifestation of state attorneys general engaging in
national partisan conflict, nine Republican attorneys general issued "A Report
on Obama Administration Violations of Law" as the presidential campaign
heated up in March 2012.234 Published by the Republican State Leadership
Committee, the report promised "as the states' chief legal officers, the attorneys general will make a concerted effort to educate their states' voters on the
impacts that the Obama Administration's legal violations have on their every

232.

See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL

POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 189 (2015) (finding "seventy-five cases involved par-

tisan participation among AGs [80% or more of states on a brief from AGs of a single party] during
the first five years of the Obama administration," more than the total for either the Reagan (23) or
Clinton (68) presidencies, and on pace to top the previous record under George W. Bush (89 cases));
see also Devins & Prakash, supra note 149, at 2140 (finding in a study of attorneys general refusals
to defend challenges to state laws that "the post-2008 laws left undefended were overwhelmingly unpopular with the attorney general's political base (or the governor's when the latter appointed the
attorney general). Democrats refused to defend same-sex marriage bans; Republicans refused to defend restrictive gun laws and statutes protecting same-sex couples").
233. NOLETTE, supra note 232, at 195.
234. See Attorneys GeneralJoin Forcesto Call Into Account Illegal Obama Administration Violations, REPUBLICAN STATE LEADERSHIP COMM. (Mar. 5, 2012), [http://web.archive.org/web/2012030

8231106/http://rslc.com/ blog/News/postMEMOA Report on Obama Administration Violations of
Law].
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day lives." 23 5
Such polarization can drive attorneys general away from articulating individual or common state interests in federalism and other issues, and toward
more transactional partisan alliances. 2 36 Reporter Eric Lipton, for example,
found that industry lawyers "have written drafts of legal filings that attorneys
general have used almost verbatim. In some cases, they have become an adjunct to the office by providing much of the legal work, including bearing the
cost of litigation, in exchange for up to 20 percent of any settlement." 2 37 Professor Nolette explains how attorneys general challenging the Affordable Care
Act outsourced much of the states' litigation to the National Federation for
Independent Business. 238 Meanwhile, partisanship on both sides of that case
drew attorneys general to not only take sides against attorneys general in other
states (a common practice when state interests conflict), but also join other
officials (such as governors) against the attorneys general of those states in
doing so.239 "As AGs have defined their defense of state interests in increasingly polarized terms," Professor Nolette observes, "it has led to growing con24 0
flicts between AGs and other state institutions."
Beyond conflicts within the states, polarization compromises the institutional role of attorneys general as a faithful voice of the states in the Supreme
Court. A recent unpublished study of state attorneys general by Sarah Esty

235. Id.
236.

See Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TiMms (Oct. 29,

2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/us/lobbyists-bearing-gifts-pursue-attomeys-general.html;
see generally Fred Lucas, Nine State AGs Cite 21 Illegal Actions by Obama Administration, CNS

NEWS (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:53 PM), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/nine-state-ags-cite-2 1-illegalactions-obama-administration (commenting on findings by nine attorneys general of potential illegal
actions by Obama Administration).
237. See Lipton, supra note 236.
238.

See NOLETTE, supranote 232, at 170-80.

239. See id. at 175-76.
240. See id. ("In the ACA litigation, for example, several governors and state legislatures attempted
to influence their AGs' decisions either to join or refrain from joining the ongoing litigation. Idaho's
state legislature became the first of several to pass legislation purporting to require the AG to file a
lawsuit against the ACA, and the Georgia legislature even introduced articles of impeachment against
the state's Democratic AG for refusing to join the litigation. The Republican governors of Nevada
and Mississippi both announced that they were hiring special outside counsel to represent their states
after the states' Democratic AGs had declined to do so, an action both AGs claimed violated their right
to exclusive control over litigation in the name of their state. Meanwhile, Democratic legislators criticized their states' Republican AGs for joining the challenge to the ACA. In Washington State, for
example, the Democratic legislature moved to reduce Republican AG Rob McKenna's budget, and
Seattle's city attorney initiated a lawsuit seeking to force McKenna's withdrawal from the litigation.").

613

[Vol. 45: 575, 2018]

Hearing the States
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

finds "strong evidence that states primarily pursue ideological outcomes they
prefer due to their political beliefs, with the federalism position necessary to
achieve that outcome as a secondary concern." 24 1 Such partisanship can increase the efficiency with which attorneys general communicate popular sentiment to the courts. However, this could come at a predictable cost to their
credibility "[t]o the extent that courts value state input on cases because they
see states as defenders of the Constitutional separation of powers and a bulwark against federal government tyranny." 24 2 Partisanship compromises the
distinct capacities attorneys general have to assist the Court in developing federalism along principled rather than partisan lines. 24 3 "If states are calculatingly using the language of federalism to advance partisan and ideological
ends," Ms. Esty argues, "they ought to be treated just like other politically
motivated private actors like the ACLU or NRA, without special deference."
244 If the Court needs credible arguments from the states in federalism cases,
threats to states' credibility become threats to the Court's capacity to pursue a
principled federalism.

241. See Sarah Esty, State Federalism Preferences Under Bush and Obama: An Empirical Assessment of Partisan Federalism 32 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
242. See id. at 36-37.
243. See id. at 32; see also Lemos & Quinn, supra note 179, at 1262-63 (analyzing a compilation
of data on state amicus filings in Supreme Court cases from 1970-2013 and partisanship of attorneys
general, and concluding that at least some of the coalitions ofjoining and opposing states did reflect
attorneys general partisanship).
244. See Esty, supra note 241, at 37.
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C.

How to Help the CourtHear the States Better

The extension of national political polarization into state attorney general
offices raises serious potential conflicts of interest between the lawyerly duty
to discern and articulate state legal interests and the increasing draw of national partisan and interest group influence. 24 5 More importantly for the Supreme Court, it also risks the states' credibility at its bar. 246 The Court is situated far from the states both as a matter of geography and experience. It
needs to hear both principled arguments and popular sentiment from attorneys
general in its federalism docket, but recent increases in partisanship reduces
the ratio of legal signal to political noise. 24 7
Attorneys general already enjoy a privileged position at the Court under
its rules and as a matter of practice. 24 8 Still, there are several potential reforms,
large and small, that may help the Court hear the states better in federalism
cases. Several procedural changes, mostly minor, could amplify the voice of
the states through attorneys general at both the petition and merits stage. 2 49
Some changes in the Court's deliberations also could reinforce the role of state
attorneys general as independent voices of state interests. 2 50
1.

Procedural Changes

Supreme Court rules privilege state attorneys general relative to other parties. These rules often parallel the provisions directed toward the United
States and the Solicitor General. For example, Rule 29 reinforces the statute
providing for notice to and intervention by the Attorney General of the United
States or a state attorney general "wherein the constitutionality of any Act of
Congress [or any statute of that State] affecting the public interest is drawn in
question." 2 51 Where a state is not a party, Rule 29 requires petitioners to serve
notice of a constitutional challenge to a state statute "on the Attorney General

245. See Paul Nolette, State Litigation During the Obama Administration: Diverging Agendas in
an Era ofPolarizedPolitics,44 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 451, 452 (2014); see also Lipton, supranote

236.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See Nolette, supra note 245, at 453-54.
See id. at 453-54.
See id. at 452.
See infra Section IV.C.1.
See infra Section IV.C.2.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2016); SUP. CT. R. 29.
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of that State." 252 This extends the notice and intervention rule from lower
courts, but does not itself provide for state participation in the case. That is
addressed by the rules governing amicus briefs. 253 Just as the Solicitor General may file an amicus brief by right under Rule 37, "[n]o motion for leave
to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the brief is presented . .. on behalf
of a State, Commonwealth, Territory, or Possession when submitted by its
Attorney General." 254
The value of these procedural privileges is diluted, however, by the
Court's "open door" policy to amicus briefs over the past fifty years. 2 55 As
Professors Kearney & Merrill explain, experienced counsel routinely consent
to amicus briefs, and when consent is withheld, the Court routinely grants
motions for leave to file, with the effect of "pernit[ting] essentially unlimited
filings of amicus briefs in argued cases." 256 As a result, the number of amicus
briefs continues to climb, reaching 171 filings in the combined cases under
NationalFederationofIndependent Business v. Sebelius.2 57 Some commentators suggest the Court should reimpose practical limits on amicus briefs,
such as Professor Allison Orr Larsen's proposal to limit the number of amici
through party designations or other means. 258 State briefs amounted to nearly
40% of the amicus briefs filed in recent terms, an increase from 28% two decades before, so the problem for states includes dilution by the increased volume of state briefs, not just those of other amici. 259 Increased partisanship,
channeled through the rise of organizations like the RAGA and the DAGA in
amicus briefs, could lead to what Professors Clayton and McGuire call "amicus overload," countering the states' original successful effort to coordinate
briefs around state interests. 26 0 This includes an increasing number of cases

252. See SUP. CT. R. 29(4)(c).
253. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.
254. See id. at 37(4).
255. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus Curiae Briefs on the

Supreme Court, 148 U. PENN. L. REv. 743, 761-67 (2000).
256.

See id. at 762.

257. See 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see also Harper, supranote 183, at 1513.
258. See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1809-10
(2014); see also Michael Solimine, Retooling the Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REv. Online 151, 165-

66 (2016), https://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/retooling-amicus-machine (arguing
for limiting amicus briefs, but excluding the United States and state attorneys general from any limit).
259. See Harper,supra note 183, at 1519 n.105.
260. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text; see generally Clayton & McGuire, supra note
174, at 23.
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in which states appear on both sides of a case. 261
The Court can hear the states better by calling for or allowing additional
state briefing and argument in more federalism cases. In challenges to federal
law in which the United States is not a party, it will be notified under Rule 29
and the Court can call for the views of the Solicitor General. 26 2 States, however, are not always parties to such constitutional challenges, which might be
brought by federal criminal defendants or regulated private parties. 26 3 For example, Michael Greve and others find "the states' amicus practice seems
suboptimal" in preemption cases, where "[s]tate participation is substantially
higher in cases in which a state is already a party than in wholly private cases,
where state amici might contribute a distinctive, authentic perspective." 26 4 A
"call for the views of the state attorneys general" could help the Court ensure
it hears state interests in all federalism cases. 26 5 Although state attorneys general have a much broader portfolio of work and no one state may be able to
respond to such a call, there are several large state attorney general offices of
various perspectives who may be prepared to brief on demand if the call
comes.

266

261. See Lemos & Quinn, supra note 179, at 1268 (emphasis added) ("In most cases, AGs' amicus
briefs are not explicitly opposed by other state AGs. Until very recently, these unopposed coalitions
of brief signers were generally bipartisan, with average partisanship similar to that of the population
of state AGs then serving. The coalitions of unopposed amici have begun to take on more of a partisan
hue in recent years, but most of the movement is due to Republican AGs writing briefs that other
Republicans support and that Democratic AGs neither support nor oppose.").
262. See SUP. CT. R. 29(4)(c).
263.

See id.; see, e.g., Greve et al., supra note 141, at 370.

264. See Greve etal., supranote 141, at 370. As the authors explain, "[r]allying support for a state's
petition is a relatively low-cost proposition; monitoring wholly private cases and formulating a common state position in those cases involves much higher transaction costs." Id. A call for the views of
the state attorneys general by the Supreme Court in appropriate cases could reduce (or at least shift to
the Court) the states' monitoring costs, thereby increasing the supply of credible federalism arguments
in private cases.
265. The Court rarely calls for the views of state attorneys general, and apparently has called for
the views of a state solicitor general just once, at the petition stage in No. 08-1596, Rhine v. Deaton.
See Amy Howe, New invitation brieffrom Texas Solicitor General, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 23, 2009),

http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/12/new-invitation-brief-from-texas-solicitor-general/.
There the
Texas Solicitor General recommended that certiorari be denied, and the Court did so. See id.; Rhine
v. Deaton, No. 08-1596, Docket, https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-1596.htm.
266. See NOLETTE, supra note 232, at 44. According to Professor Paul Nolette's database of state
amicus participation, the top five lead authors of state amicus briefs in the Supreme Court between
1980 and 2013 were a politically and geographically diverse set of states, each of which averaged at
least two amicus briefs per term: California (193 briefs), New York (110 briefs), Texas, (94 briefs),
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Beyond ensuring opportunities for state amicus briefing, the Court can
hear the states at oral argument in federalism cases. In 2008, Richard Lazarus
noted that the Court recently granted several motions by state solicitors general to participate in argument as amicus curiae. 26 7 Despite the overall increase in state amicus activity, however, the Court has been less receptive to
state amici at the lectern since then. The Court granted 29 of 39 state requests
for argument as amici from the 1996 term through the 2006 term, but only 3
of 18 state requests from the 2007 term through the 2016 term. 268 Although
the Court's reasons for denying the states are unclear, the decline coincides
with several state requests to argue against traditional state interests, and possibly for narrower partisan interests. For example, the Court denied Texas's
requests to argue with respondents in D.C. v. Heller and with petitioners in
McDonaldv. City of Chicago, in both cases taking sides against the state or
local government. 2 69 More recently, the Court denied Nevada's request to
argue as amicus in support of petitioner in Murr v. Wisconsin, a direct challenge to a sister state's position at argument. 270 The Court may be deciding
that the traditional state interest is already represented at the lectern in these
cases, and that states taking the position adverse to that position have little to
add to the parties' arguments.
Given the increased involvement of private interests in state supreme
court litigation, the Court also should become more skeptical of ghostwriting
by and collusion with parties in state amicus briefs. 271 Rule 37(6) excludes
state (and federal) amicus briefs from disclosure of "whether counsel for a
party authored the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a

Ohio (87 briefs) and Alabama (70 briefs). See id.
267. See Lazarus, supra note 63, at 1562 n.317.
268. Dan Schweitzer, State Arguments as Amicus Curiae: 1996-2016 Terms (memo on file with
author).

269. See District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?
filename=/docketfiles/07-290.htmg McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521. Notably, the Court
did allow the National Rifle Association to argue as amicus in McDonald. See id.
270. See Murrv. Wisconsin, No. 15-214, https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/
docket/docketfiles/html/public/15-214.html.
271.

See Julia Blackwell Gelinas & Maggie L. Smith, Ethical Issues in Appellate Practice, IND.

STATE BAR Ass'N (June 13, 2016), c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.inbar.org/resource/resmgr/CLE_2016/
Appellate Ethics.pdf. Former Alabama Solicitor General Kevin Newsom reported filing nearly half
of his amicus briefs "in support of litigants represented by private-sector counsel-never simply as a
favor, of course, but rather because in each of those cases the state's institutional interest lined up
nicely with one of the parties' positions." Newsom, supra note 214.
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party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief," as well as broader disclosure of "every person or entity,
other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel" who monetarily
contributed to the preparation of the brief.272 Removing the state exception,
and including them in the rule's scope for other interested parties, would enable the Court to better police interest group ghostwriting or payments that
could undermine the credibility of the brief.273 It also provides an incentive
for states to keep their amicus brief deliberations and preparations "in house"
where the offices' institutional constraints may better align with state interests. Although such a policy paradoxically would seek to strengthen state
interests by removing a privilege available only to states and the federal government, it accounts for the greater susceptibility of elected state attorneys
general to such politicization. 274 States also may be able to bolster their attorney general's fidelity to the state, and independence from outside influence,
with targeted campaign finance reforms. 2 75
2.

Deliberative Changes

As the studies discussed above suggest, the Supreme Court already accords special consideration to the states in federalism cases. Continued research and awareness of the benefits of principled attorney general advocacy,
and the costs of partisan briefing tactics, may prompt the Court to refine its

272. SUP. CT. R. 37(6).
273.

See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Energy Firms in Secretive Alliance with Attorneys General,N.Y. TIMES

(Dec. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/us/politics/energy-firms-in-secretive-alliancewith-attomeys-general.html (finding one example of ghostwriting outside the Court, the office of onetime Oklahoma Attorney General (now Environmental Protection Agency administrator) Scott Pruitt
submitted a letter to the EPA that was written by a regulated party, copied "onto state government
stationery with only a few word changes, and sent . . . to Washington with the attorney general's
signature.").

274. See supra text accompanying notes 240-42.
275. See Anthony Johnstone, Outside Influence, 13 ELECTION L.J. 117, 131-36 (2014) (analyzing
differential regulation of outside influence in campaign finance). Professor Eli Savit recently suggested that state attorneys general might also be subject to more stringent campaign finance regulations, given their quasi-judicial role in representing state interests. See Eli Savit, The New Front in
the Clean Air Wars: Fossil-Fuel Influence Over State Attorneys General-andHow It Might Be
Checked, 115 MICH. L. REv. 839, 864 (2017) ("Williams-Yulee [v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656

(2015)] offers at least some possibility that willing states might be able to rein in special-interest
groups' outsized influence over AGs.").
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approach to state briefs on its own. To start, the Court should pay close attention to the states' interests, which must be set out expressly at the beginning
of an amicus brief, and should be elaborated throughout the brief.27 6 Structural
arguments for state policy autonomy under federalism should carry more
weight than substantive arguments for imposing one state's preferred policy
on the others. 277 One powerful example of a structural, rather than substantive, state interest is Alabama's brief in Gonzales v. Raich.278 It disclaimed
any policy agreement in its first sentence. 2 79 "The Court should make no mistake: The State[] of Alabama . . . d[id] not appear [] to champion (or even to
defend) the public policies underlying California's so-called 'compassionate
use' law," instead staking its claim on a strong (though unsuccessful) argu28 0
ment from federalism.
The Court also should consider more carefully the weight it accords the
number of states joining a brief.28 1 Partisan mobilization through RAGA and
DAGA may make it easier for states to draw large numbers at either end of a
polarizing issue, but those numbers may no longer be a reliable signal of general state interests. 28 2 Instead, as Professor Michael Solimine suggests, only a
supermajority of states may ensure bipartisan consensus on state interests,
"and such requirements can lead to better decisionmaking (i.e., the decision
to join an amicus brief) because it forces states with disparate interests to make

276. See SUP. CT. R. 37(5).
277. See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law Litigation in an Age ofPolari-

zation 1 (Mar. 8, 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract=3137317 (distinguishing "vertical" conflicts, "in
which states sue to preserve their autonomy to go their own way on divisive issues," and "horizontal"
conflicts, "in which different groups of states vie for control of national policy," and arguing the latter
"will tend to aggravate polarization").
278. See Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Gonzalesv. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454).
279.

See id.

.

280. See id. "While the amici States may not see eye to eye with some of their neighbors concerning
the wisdom of decriminalizing marijuana possession and use in certain instances, they support their
neighbors' prerogative in our federalist system to serve as 'laboratories for experimentation'. .
Whether California and the other compassionate-use States are 'courageous'-or instead profoundly
misguided-is not the point. The point is that, as a sovereign member of the federal union, California
is entitled to make for itself the tough policy choices that affect its citizens. By stepping in here, under
the guise of regulating interstate commerce, to stymie California's 'experiment[],' Congress crossed
the constitutional line." Id. at 2-3 (footnotes and citations omitted).
281. See Clayton & McGuire, supra note 174, at 17.
282. See supra notes 225-27, 260 and accompanying text (explaining the influence of RAGA and
DAGA on bipartisan issues and their effect on state interests).
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common ground." 283
The Court also should look to heterogeneity, self-consciously recognizing
the value of diverse state coalitions. In McDonnellv. United States, the Court
called out as persuasive amicus briefs from "[s]ix former Virginia attorneys
general-four Democrats and two Republicans," and "77 former state attorneys general from States other than Virginia-41 Democrats, 35 Republicans,
and 1 independent." 28 4 Citing this example, Professor Solimine suggests the
Court "only give deference (if at all) to amicus briefs joined by significant
numbers of [attorneys general] from both political parties." 28 5 Other forms of
heterogeneity, such as the regional coalitions of the "Old South," "Big Sky,"
and others identified by Professors Waltenberg and Swinford also might signal increased credibility. 28 6 There will still be some cases where the nature of
state interests will limit the number of states joining a brief, including along
party lines given regional or even partisan valence of some policy interests,
but the Court should be most confident about state interests when they are
argued in a broadly bipartisan brief
Finally, as in the rules of evidence, admissions against states' federalism
interests might be a further indicator of reliability. 28 7 During the Warren and
Burger Courts, states making nationalist arguments wielded almost veto-like
powers in federalism cases where states filed briefs on both sides. 28 8 This cure
may be worse than the disease. It could empower partisan influence on potential hold-out states willing to argue for preemption of other states' laws, for
example. Professor Solimine suggests the Court should "give weight to a
[state] amicus brief that argues against a state interest only when the brief specifically makes convincing functionalist arguments . . . that the need for national uniformity outweighs the federalism values of interstate competition

283. See Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development ofFederalism
Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 393 (2012).

284. 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
285. See Solimine, supranote 258.
286.
287.

See WALTENBURG & SWINFORD, supra note 155, at 73-74.
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).

288. See Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 174, at 605 (studying the Supreme Court's federalism decisions from 1953 to 1986 and finding "[i]n those cases where states filed briefs supporting national
power, the outcome reflected that value 100 percent of the time"). Conversely, the Solicitor General
of the United States can wield veto-like power over preemption when a Republican administration
"opts against both its institutional interest and the administration's business clientele" by opposing
federal preemption. See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court:A
PreliminaryEmpiricalAssessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 74 (2006).
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and safeguarding local variation that would be compromised." 28 9 This proposal is closer to the mark, although it is hard to imagine a case in which the
Court should give no weight to state arguments made by a state attorney general. Despite the risks of national partisan distortion of state legal interests, 290
the state's chief legal officer is uniquely situated to voice those interests.29 1
Instead, given the risk of partisan influence in the briefing process, the Court
should remain attuned to the political valence of the briefs and suspicious of
arguments that serve partisan goals without any apparent relationship to state
federalism interests.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article offers a prescription for the states at least as much as for the
Supreme Court. Unlike other elected officials, attorneys general represent the
states as lawyers, not just as politicians. 29 2 States find success, as they often
did in the development of the New Federalism in the 1990s, when they give
voice to diverse coalitions articulating principled arguments from state interests. 293 States risk failure, as they do under the increased partisan polarization
of the past decade, when they merely echo the policies of national political
and special interest organizations. 294 By discerning state interests independently of national politics, attorneys general can credibly help the Supreme
Court answer federalism's hard questions. 2 95 In the end, the Supreme Court
needs the states as much as the states need the Supreme Court.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See Solimine, supranote 283, at 406.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.C.2.

294. See supra Part III.
295. See supra Part IV.
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